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Barnes ^{we} ~~Miss~~

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RELATIONS**

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Lookwood memo

ORRICK PALMER & DANLOUST

COUNSELLORS AND ATTORNEYS AT LAW

San Francisco, California

San Francisco

Small Address "Change"

San Francisco, California

February 15, 1937

Mr. ~~Wood~~ Wood, Jr.
American Council
Institute of Pacific Relations
12 W. 52nd St.,
New York, N.Y.
Dear Sir:

Since the first of January and until last week-
end I have been tied up on a day and night job; and only
now am I enjoying a brief breathing spell. This explains
why I have not answered sooner your letter of January 27
and the letter which followed it the early part of last
week.

I certainly do appreciate very much your thought-
fulness in giving my name to Mr. Veatch in connection with
the positions on the staff of the High Commissioner to the
Philippines which are now open. It appears to be the kind
of work in which I have long been interested.

However, my present job is such that I would not
give it up unless the job which ^{Mr.} Veatch has in mind is
extremely interesting.

I do not think it best to make my approach to
Mr. Veatch through a letter, and would much prefer to have a
conference with him in Washington. After talking the matter
over with Ruth, I have decided to write him a brief note, a
copy of which is enclosed, asking for an interview after we

*DeLaney
Gladys only
10/19/61
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ORRICK PALMER & DANLOUIS

COUNSELLORS AND ATTORNEYS AT LAW

FINANCIAL CENTER BUILDING

SAN FRANCISCO

TELEPHONE 4000

WOODVILLE, ILL. MOORE & ORRICK

-2-

return to New York. in case the jobs must be filled before our return, I am afraid I must let the opportunity pass this time. Nevertheless, I should appreciate very much a chance to meet Mr. Veatch and talk over generally the question of a job with the State Department.

Thanks again for keeping me in mind. Ruth sends her best along with mine to Jimmy, yourself and the other Lockwoods.

Sincerely,

Robert T. Kimberlin
ROBERT T. KIMBERLIN

P.S. I am not just sure when we shall return to New York, whether within the next two or three weeks or not until the first of April.

February 15, 1937

Mr. Roy Veatch
Office of the Economic Advisor
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

Mr. Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr., of the Institute of Pacific Relations, has written me that he has referred my name to you in connection with some positions, as legal advisor or assistant legal advisor, on the staff of the High Commissioner to the Philippines.

From what Mr. Lockwood tells me, the sort of work which the men who will fill these posts will do would be extremely interesting to me. However, I am very happy in my present job. I would, nevertheless, appreciate the opportunity to have a conference with you in Washington about the matter.

I shall be detained here in San Francisco on business for at least another ten days, and there is a possibility that I shall not return to New York until the first of March or possibly even the first of April. In case the above positions must be filled before my return, I guess I must regretfully pass up the opportunity to speak to you about them. However, even though they are filled by the time I return to New York, I should appreciate a chance to meet you and talk

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over generally the question of working for the State
Department.

Very truly yours,

1276

February 3, 1937

Mr. Robert T. Kimberlin
c/o I. Wallitner
Crown, Zellerbach Corporation
343 Sansome
San Francisco

Dear Bob,

In reply to my note to Roy Veatch about you, he has written to suggest that you send him a statement of your background, training and experience, including the essential details about your age and present salary. He says he would like more information before he throws your name in the hopper.

You may not thank me for taking the initiative in proposing your name for the Philippine job, but if so, all you need to do is to write to him or to me that the fields look greener elsewhere.

With best regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr.

W:L:AA

1217

January 27, 1937

Mr. Robert T. Kimberlin
c/o I. Wallitner
Crown, Zellerbach Corporation
347 Sansome Street
San Francisco, California

Dear Bob,

We have recently had a request from a friend in the State Department asking us to recommend candidates for several positions on the staff of the High Commissioner to the Philippines. Among the posts to which appointments are to be made are those of legal advisor, at a salary of \$11,000, and one or two assistant legal advisors at something less.

I have no reason to suppose that you are looking for a change of climate. But it occurs to me that you would be a swell candidate for one of these jobs, and that the possibility might appeal to you, in view of your interest in the field of international relations and your hope of eventually practicing in this field. You know as much about the duties of this staff as I do. The High Commissioner, as American representative in the Islands, has very wide powers during the commonwealth period which lasts until about 1945. Presumably, the legal advisor is concerned with the legal aspects of Philippine-American relations under the act creating the commonwealth and governing its status.

If you care to inquire about it, might I suggest that you write Mr. Roy Veatch, Office of the Economic Advisor, Department of State, Washington, D. C. I have sent Veatch a note suggesting your name and outlining briefly your qualifications.

With best regards to you and Ruth, I am

Sincerely yours,

Edw. F. Lockwood, Jr.

FEL:AA

December 29, 1937.

Dear Joe,

Since writing you some weeks ago with regard to a possible North China study, I have been so preoccupied with other matters that I haven't yet been able to give it further thought. I am wondering whether you now have more definite plans concerning the possible official investigation which you mention in your letter of November 13th. I think it is quite likely that we shall attempt to publish a SURVEY article on Japan's economic program in North China, past and present, sometime this spring. Naturally any study which you make and which we are permitted to see will be of invaluable assistance to us. Consequently I am hoping to hear from you that your plan has materialized and that you are actively engaged in such a study.

Jinny joins me in wishing you and Sally a Happy New Year.

Cordially yours,

Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr.

Mr. Joseph Jones, Jr.,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 13, 1937.

Dear Bill:

It is curious that you should suggest a study of Japan's economic program in North China at precisely the same time that I was contemplating a study of a similar nature. I feel the need of such a study very much. I had in mind getting other departments to cooperate in this matter, and Mr. Wheeler of the Department of Agriculture has already promised to do the agricultural side. Perhaps the Bureau of Mines can be persuaded to write a memorandum on the mineral resources of North China, but the question of ownership would probably have to be decided from information secured elsewhere. The question of trade would probably have to be worked up here.

The question is how to cooperate with you. I suppose the most effective way would be for us to conduct the study and then to supply you with information. On the other hand, our study might be held up indefinitely and you would be left holding the sack. If you could come down I think that it might be arranged for you to see the basic diplomatic and consular reports on the economic resources of North China. It also appears to me that Mr. C. F. Remer might have a great deal of information concerning North China; the information in his book does not segregate investments in North China, but I imagine that such a segregation could be made from his notes.

These are random thoughts which appear to lead nowhere in particular, but they might give you an idea of how best we might cooperate. I think that whatever study is made should be got out within the next two or three

Mr. Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr.
American Council
Institute of Pacific Relations
129 East 52d Street
New York, New York

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months. I say this because Mr. Feis got the impression from Mr. Carter the other day that the I.R.R. contemplated an extensive survey of some sort lasting about two years.

Please let me know what you think of my ruminations on the subject. I would like to be more precise but I cannot be at this time.

Cordially yours,

Jac

November 10, 1937.

Dear Joe,

I am pleased to learn that you have shifted over to the Far Eastern Division. It is easy to understand that a more restricted range of activity will be more satisfactory, although even now you certainly have a large field in which to work. If any ideas occur to you as to studies which we might usefully undertake in the SURVEY please pass them along.

One thing occurs to me on which you may be able to give us some definite assistance now. I am contemplating a SURVEY article on Japan's economic program in North China, with especial reference to the period before July 7th. The factual data on this subject are very sketchy, and it remains to be seen whether enough reliable information can be assembled to justify this attempt. I am wondering whether you have information and reports on file which an outsider might consult and which would be useful in this connection. I have reference not only to the details of Japanese plans and activities in the northern provinces but also the extent of other foreign interests and the way in which they have been affected by the Japanese penetration. Will you be good enough to drop me a note telling me whether there is anything you can send me or anything which I could use if I should come to Washington.

With best wishes, I am,

Sincerely yours,

Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr.

Mr. Joseph Jones, Jr.,
Division of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State,
Washington, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE ECONOMIC ADVISER

Washington, D. C.
May 27, 1937

Mr. William W. Lockwood
Institute of Pacific Relations
129 East 52nd Street
New York, New York

Dear Bill:

I am very much obliged to you for the Farley study and also for the more elaborate studies which you sent me. I find them very interesting.

For some time before coming to the State Department I was impressed with the very special and anachronistic policy which we maintain vis-a-vis Japan and China. As result of historical accidents and largely personal diplomacy, there has been built up a body of special privileges and prerogatives which the United States maintains in the Far East. Professor Bemis denounces with considerable vehemence these outstanding blunders in our foreign policy.

Needless to say, since coming to the State Department my respect for the policy which we maintain in the Pacific has not been enhanced. Although I am a rank newcomer in the field, and there is much which I need to know, I am still impressed with the necessity of a thorough and integrated study of our policy in the Far East. I have no preconceived notions as to what should be done but I have a very strong feeling that drastic changes would be a good thing, a feeling, however, which could easily be dispelled if the facts proved otherwise. As I see it, the study should include all of our special privileges and extraterritorial rights, our naval bases, and every privilege which we do not maintain in other parts of the world. It would include, of course, a study of the policy which we must adopt in the face of China's growing nationalism. This in turn would imply a thorough knowledge of Chinese psychology and capabilities; for example, would China's best interests be

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served by sticking to the letter of our treaty rights and preventing Chinese control of basic industries and foreign trade or by leaving it in the hands of private management? It would involve a reconsideration of our special position ~~as a~~ more or less protector of China against Japan. It would involve the possibilities of a trade agreement with both China and Japan. It would involve, further, a study of possible credit policies to be adopted, immigration, etc.

As I see it, the United States is going to have to bear the burden in the future of proving that her special privileges and prerogatives are justified. We are faced not with one growing nationality but with two, and at this juncture prestige is a tremendously important factor, a factor which would probably mean much more in trade and friendship than a policy of sticking to the letter of treaty rights.

You will see that my program is not unambitious. Further, you are aware of the obstacles, first to the making of such a study and secondly to the carrying out of any policy which it should recommend other than muddling along as we are now. I should like your reaction to my thoughts in the matter, particularly as regards extraterritorial and special privileges in China. We are at present liquidating one of the major blunders of our diplomacy, that is, seizure of the Philippines. It seems to me that we might think about liquidating some of the other major blunders of our diplomacy in the Far East.

You will recall that last fall there was considerable optimism aroused by the tripartite currency agreement between this country, France and the United Kingdom. It was hoped that the retreat of democracies had been checked and there was considerable searching around for new measures which the United States might initiate for forwarding international cooperation and preventing war. A group of us met here in Washington for several days trying to decide what the United States might do, and the discussion was confined almost wholly to concessions which the United States might make in Europe. The upshot of the discussion was that there was practically nothing which the United States might offer to Europe, but I raised the question (and it received scant discus-

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sion) that at least the United States could do much to pacify the Pacific area and at least protect its western flank. It so happens that the matter is within our hands, and if we could establish a firm friendship with Japan and China, I think it would be a great contribution to world peace. Neutrality might possibly work so long as a war were confined to Europe but if it raged in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, I don't see how it would be even remotely possible for us to stay out.

Perhaps you regard me as naïve, and I apologize for the length of this letter. Nevertheless, I should be very happy to have your comments.

Sincerely,

Joe

P.S. This letter is strictly entre nous!

It is not just a study which should be made - an assemblage of facts - but a critical examination made with a view to practical action!

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF THE ECONOMIC ADVISER

Washington, D. C.
May 5, 1937

Mr. William ~~Hookwood~~
American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations
129 East 52nd Street
New York, New York

Dear Bill:

I note in the JAPAN WEEKLY CHRONICLE that a Miss Miriam ~~Farley~~ of your organization has put out a pamphlet entitled "America's Stake in the Far East". Will you be good enough to send me a copy? If there is a charge, please say so and I will remit.

It was nice to see you and Virginia down here recently. I hope you will come down often.

Cordially,

Joseph M. Jones
Joseph M. Jones.

JMJ:EB

May 11, 1937

Mr. Joseph M. Jones
1616 Sixteenth Street
New York, N. Y.

Dear Joe,

I have sent you under separate cover a copy of Miriam Farley's "America's Stake in the Far East." This is a small pamphlet prepared last year primarily for the American League of Women Voters, and summarizing in rather simple fashion the material contained in three successive Far Eastern Survey articles published last summer. On second thought, I am also sending you these three articles, for you may be able to make use of some of the statistical material and the discussion which did not find its way into the pamphlet.

This was a preliminary effort on our part to get some kind of conspectus of the economic relations of the United States with this area as a whole. As you will see, it is rather elementary in character, and we are anxious to follow it up with a full-dress study of the field from both an historical and analytical point of view. This spring we drafted a two-year research project on trade investments and economic foreign policy in this region, and attempted to secure a grant from a foundation to finance the scheme. Our application was unsuccessful and the whole thing is now hanging fire. Sooner or later I should like very much to get the advice and judgment of you and others in Washington on the best way of proceeding with such a project, which seems to me of first-rate importance. I will not bother you now with such a request, but if any suggestions occur to you as a result of looking over these articles, I would like very much to have them.

The article on the study of ~~American~~ Investments in the Far East," for which I was responsible, was handicapped of course by the lack of up-to-date statistical material. This lack has not subsequently been remedied except in the case of the Philippines, where, as you know, the recent Tariff Commission Report on United States Philippine Trade presents a new estimate some \$50,000,000 lower than the estimate made in 1932, and differing materially in character. A second revision now called for is a reduction of American holdings of Japanese bonds from \$164,000,000 to \$130,000,000, as a result of a new estimate by the Japanese Ministry of Finance of the repatriation of foreign securities as of last July. From a statistical point of view, the whole subject requires a new official survey, although in terms of policy it makes little difference whether the total is one or two hundred millions more or less.

There is another matter to which I want to call your attention - that of American responsibility for the lack of factory legislation in the international settlement at Shanghai. Perhaps this does not come within your

purview, but there is a single contradiction between the general philosophy of the New Deal on the one hand, and the apparent acquiescence of the State Department in the continued obstruction of Chinese efforts to institute some measure of factory control in Shanghai. As you know, extraterritoriality is the stumbling block.

Recently I wrote Hornbeck, asking whether he could give us a statement of the American attitude of this issue. In particular, I wanted to know what position the American authorities took last year when a draft agreement negotiated by the Shanghai Municipal Council and the Chinese Government was rejected by the Consular body. Hornbeck's reply says that the State Department is sympathetic, is giving the matter careful thought, etc. - in other words, says nothing. I am mentioning this to you privately in the hope that you will be willing to push for some action in case the question ever comes before you for consideration. There has been altogether too much stalling, and, if the situation is such that the United States cannot do anything about it single-handed, then at least the responsibility for further delay should be publicly defined.

Sincerely yours,

Wm. W. Lockwood, Jr.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 3, 1944.

Dear Carter:


Your letter of July 27 reached me while I was absent from Washington and on returning this morning I am sending you at once, enclosed herewith, my check for \$250.00 as a further contribution to the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations. I cannot at this time make definite commitments for 1944 or 1945 as my financial affairs are by no means in a happy state, and with the forthcoming taxes it is far from certain that I shall be able to make the same next year at all. You can, however, always count upon me to support the Institute as far as practicable.

With kindest regards and the best of wishes for the success of your efforts, I am

Frederick S. Pratt
Frederick S. Pratt

Enclosure

Mr. Edgar S. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
123 East 64th Street,
New York 22, N. Y.



January 30, 1942

Dear Mr. Greene:

Thank you very much for your note on the procedure followed in submitting nominations to the American Council's Board of Trustees. I agree with you that the present method is not very satisfactory. Some people feel as you do that it looks too much like a performance "trifling with" jobs. Others - for example, one of our most interested members whom I saw yesterday - would prefer that we make the Board self-perpetuating in some fashion and without then with a ballot at all. Sometime this year I hope to be able to give the matter careful consideration and work out a more suitable plan. Frankly, since taking office late in 1941, I have been so preoccupied with immediate questions of war-time progress that I have not been able to give this matter the attention it deserves.

I also am completely unable to understand and justify Fred Field's political reasoning during the past two years. At the same time, his long experience with the I.T.O. and his high technical competence in the field make him, in my opinion, an exceptionally valuable trustee. As for the present staff it is hard for me to see how anyone could believe that it merits the criticisms you cite. Actually the staff represents a wide range of political opinion, and in this respect it is quite representative of American public opinion at large. This is as it should be, isn't it?

With best regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Tr. W. Woodhead
Secretary

Mr. Peter S. Greene
240 Lincoln Street
Worcester, Massachusetts

WTT:HL

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ROGER S. GREENE
548 LINCOLN STREET
WORCESTER, MASS.

January 16, 1942.

Dear Mr. Lockwood:

Before the next annual meeting, that is the 1943 meeting, will you not consider changing the method of submitting nominations to the Board of Trustees of the IPR by presenting a larger number of names than the number of vacancies to be filled? The present system gives the members no chance to express their preference except by a highly organized electioneering process which few if any members would care to undertake.

For example, while I have had a high opinion of Fred Field's personal character, his judgment during the past two years has been so strange that it seemed to me that he must be almost in a psychopathic state. If a man like that is to be nominated surely one ought to have a chance to pick an alternate instead of him. When Chinese of a not particularly conservative type think that too many of the IPR staff are too much under Russian Soviet influence, as I know that they do, it would appear to be time to be more cautious. I am not objecting so much to radical views on political, economic and social subjects, on which radical views may be called for, but to the tendency to follow a party line, and to flop suddenly from one side to the other in accordance with a party directive. The latter habit is the reverse of encouraging to intellectual freedom.

Yours sincerely,



Mr. William W. Lockwood
American Council
Institute of Pacific Relations
129 East 52nd Street
New York, N. Y.

C
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P
Y

Roger S. Greene
348 Lincoln Street
Worcester, Massachusetts

January 16, 1942.

Dear Mr. Lockwood:

Before the next annual meeting, that is the 1943 meeting, will you not consider changing the method of submitting nominations to the Board of Trustees of the IPR by presenting a larger number of names than the number of vacancies to be filled? The present system gives the members no chance to express their preference except by a highly organized electioneering process which few if any members would care to undertake.

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Yours sincerely,

(signed) Roger S. Greene

Mr. William W. Lockwood
American Council
Institute of Pacific Relations
129 East 52nd Street
New York, N.Y.

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C
O
P
Y

AMERICAN COUNCIL
INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS

January 20, 1942

Dear Mr. Greene:

Thank you very much for your note on the procedure followed in submitting nominations to the American Council's Board of Trustees. I agree with you that the present method is not very satisfactory. Some people feel as you do that it looks too much like a perfunctory "railroading" job. Others - for example, one of our most interested members whom I saw yesterday - would prefer that we make the Board self-perpetuating in some fashion and not bother them with a ballot at all. Sometime this year I hope to be able to give the matter careful consideration and work out a more suitable plan. Frankly, since taking office late in 1941, I have been so preoccupied with immediate questions of wartime program that I have not been able to give this matter the attention it deserves.

I also am completely unable to understand and justify Fred Field's political reasoning during the past two years. At the same time, his long experience with the I.P.R. and his high technical competence in the field make him, in my opinion, an exceedingly valuable trustee. As for the present staff it is hard for me to see how anyone could believe that it merits the criticism you cite. Actually the staff represents a wide range of political opinion, and in this respect it is quite representative of American public opinion at large. This is as it should be, don't you think?

With best regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Wm. W. Lockwood
Secretary

Mr. Roper S. Greene
548 Lincoln Street
Worcester, Massachusetts

WWL:JL

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFF. S

OTTAWA March 17, 1942

C O P Y

My dear Carter:

I understand that the Institute of Pacific Relations is planning to make an early appeal to the Carnegie Corporation for continued financial support.

The publications of the Institute have been of very real use to me and to my colleagues in the Canadian Service, as, I am sure, they have been to other persons and organizations interested in international affairs. For this reason, and because I think you are doing, in general, a most valuable educational work, I hope the continued support of the Carnegie Corporation may be obtained. I shall be glad to have you use my name, if it can be of any assistance to you in this connection.

Yours sincerely,

(signed) H. L. Keenleyside

Edward C. Carter, Esq.
129 East 52nd Street
New York City.

~~WLB~~
~~WLB~~ from HOC

March 19, 1942

Sumner

Here is a copy of Mr. Welles's letter which he writes as Acting Secretary of State. You will note that it is not to be used publicly but it can, of course, be shown to the officers of the Carnegie Corporation and the officers of the Foundation.

C O P Y

Department of State
Washington, D.C.

March 17, 1942

My dear Mr. Carter:

I have your letter of March 11, 1942, in which you inquire with regard to the practical value of the publications and activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations. The receipt is also acknowledged of similar letters addressed to other officers of the Department.

The importance of the development of an informed public opinion with regard to problems affecting foreign relations requires no special emphasis. In the development of such a public opinion, a valuable service is rendered by organizations which seek to present in readily accessible form studies by serious scholars of current problems and to stimulate an intelligent discussion of these problems. While for obvious reasons the Department of State has necessarily adopted the practice of refraining from endorsing or sponsoring any particular private organization, I am glad to say that in the opinion of officers of the Department who are especially familiar with the activities of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the publications of the Institute have been of interest and value and the Institute has been making a substantial contribution to the development of an informed public opinion.

I note and appreciate your statement that you propose not to use this letter publicly.

Sincerely yours,

SUMNER WELLES
Acting Secretary

Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations
129 West 52nd Street
New York N.Y.

COPY

Concurrence

Coordinator of Information
Washington, D.C.

March 18, 1942

Mr. W.L. Holland
Institute of Pacific Relations
129 East 82nd Street
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Holland:

The research work of the Institute of Pacific Relations has been directly useful to the Office of the Coordinator of Information in its efforts to meet the urgent demands created by the war. Certain unpublished studies of the Institute have been made available to us during the preparation of reports and you have, yourself, found time to serve as consultant and adviser to our sections dealing with the British Empire and the Far East.

I am sending this brief acknowledgment in the hope that it may be useful to you in making plans and securing funds for the coming year. I think you will agree with us that full informal cooperation must be the basis of the effective use of the limited number of persons with adequate research training to deal with the Far East. The Office of the Coordinator of Information is looking forward to the continuance of such cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

James P. Hunter, 3rd
Deputy Coordinator

COPY

Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D.C.

March 17th 1942

Mr. W.L. Holland
Research Secretary
Institute of Pacific Relations
129 East 64th Street,
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Holland:

The Far Eastern Section of the Office of the Coordinator of Information wishes to acknowledge the assistance which it has received from the Institute of Pacific Relations and particularly from those in charge of its research activities. The outstanding example is the receipt of a number of manuscripts in advance of their publication by the Institute. These include the translation of a work by Charles Bebeau on the economic development of French Indo-China, a manuscript by H.C. Callis on foreign investments in Southeast Asia, one by Virginia Thompson on Burma, and one by Chao Ting-shi on China.

This acknowledgment may be useful to you in any appeal you may make for support during the coming year. May I express the hope that your plans for the year will include provision for further cooperation with this Section. The immediate importance of this is emphasized by the fact that our own work has become more closely integrated with that of the Army and Navy.

We look forward to the continuance of the cooperation with the Institute of Pacific Relations with confidence that such cooperation will make for effectiveness in research and economy in the use of personnel.

Sincerely yours,

C.F. Bremer, Chief
Far Eastern Section

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NEW ZEALAND LEGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. H.C. Carter, Secretary General
Institute of Pacific Relations
129 East 52nd Street, New York City

Dear Mr. Carter:

In reply to your letter of March 11th asking if I would care to express any views as to the value of IPR research and publications to official agencies of the United Nations in the present war effort, I have pleasure in stating, on behalf of myself and my New Zealand colleagues, that the publications and other activities of the Institute have been of very definite value.

As you know, I was for a long period actively associated with Institute affairs, as a Vice-President of the New Zealand Council, a delegate to two Conferences, a subscriber to and reader of all Institute publications and a collaborator in a number of its research studies; while for the past five or six years during which time I have held Ministerial office in New Zealand, it has always been my endeavour to keep in as close touch as possible with IPR activities.

I believe, therefore, that in expressing an opinion as to the value of the Institute's work, from an official point of view, I can speak with some knowledge of what it has accomplished in the past and what it is capable of doing in the future.

It is my opinion that the research programme the Institute has carried out over a number of years, has brought to light a mass of authoritative, factual and objective information about the countries, peoples and problems of the Pacific Area - a job which can only be successfully undertaken by a body, organized as the IPR is organized and functioning as the IPR functions.

My own experience, which I know is shared by others also entrusted with official responsibilities, has been that IPR publications are an indispensable aid to a proper understanding and appreciation of many questions of both national and international significance to countries who have vital interests in the Pacific Area. IPR research data, moreover, and the personal contacts and associations which the Institute fosters, are valuable not only to the academic and the scholar, but can be tremendously helpful to those whose more immediate responsibility and concern is with the formulation and administration of Government policy.

May I take this opportunity of paying special tribute to the help which the IPR has rendered and is continuing to render through dissemination service to the war effort of the United Nations. Its publications - notably the Inquiry Series - constitute what is undoubtedly the most complete and most useful documentation available on the nature, causes and consequences of the Far Eastern conflict and as such serve a particularly valuable purpose in focusing attention on those problems of political and economic adjustment which Governments and official agencies will have to face up to at the time of the peace settlement and during the reconstruction period that follows.

I am personally convinced that the usefulness and value of the kind of work which the IPR has undertaken so successfully in the past will be even greater in the future. For this reason, it is my earnest hope that the Institute will continue to flourish and that its activities may be developed and extended to the fullest extent possible.

Yours sincerely,

1200 /s/ E. Nash

UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
WEST POINT, NEW YORK


March 16, 1942.

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

In order to secure material for the Orientation Course, recently organized at the direction of the War Department, it was found necessary to call on various civilian agencies whose research work lay in the fields covered by that course. Among these agencies was the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Three of the initial drafts of the military lectures presented in the course were prepared by personnel of the I.P.R. In addition a considerable number of its pamphlets were ordered for distribution throughout the Army. These pamphlets were placed in camp libraries, recreation centers and company day-rooms.

As initial director of the course, I am convinced that no other civilian research organization in the country presents as wide, thorough, and up-to-date coverage of the Far Eastern field as that of the Institute of Pacific Relations.


Herman Beukema,
Colonel, U.S.A.,
Professor.

1301

ROOM 811
1270 Sixth Avenue
New York City

March 14, 1942

C O P Y

Mr. Edward C. Carter, Secretary-General
Institute of Pacific Relations
129 East 52nd Street
New York City

Dear Mr. Carter:

Referring to your letter of March 11th, relative the value of the information supplied by the Institute of Pacific Relations to the New York Office, Military Intelligence Division, War Department, General Staff, of which I am the Officer-in-Charge, I can state that when it has been necessary to obtain reports of an exhaustive nature, the Institute has proved a valuable source of information, and has given of its time regardless of its own commitments. I have also found it useful in checking information obtained in other quarters.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Frederick D. Sharp
Lieut. Col., G.S.C.

C
O
P
Y

WAR DEPARTMENT
Bureau of Public Relations
Washington

March 8, 1942

Miss Elizabeth ~~X~~ Downing
American Council, Institute of
Pacific Relations
129 East 52nd Street
New York, N.Y.

Dear Miss Downing:

Your program Spotlight on Asia is one of the best ideas that
have come to our attention. It is unfortunate that we did not some years
ago substitute this sort of thing for a certain amount of swing music.

.....

Sincerely yours,

(signed) G. A. ~~X~~ Lincoln

Major, C.E.
Director, Orientation Course
Bureau of Public Relations

WAR DEPARTMENT
Bureau of Public Relations
Washington

February 11, 1942

Mr. William W. Lockwood
American Council Institute of Pacific Relations
130 East 62nd Street
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Lockwood:

.....

The lectures were of great assistance to us in the rush job we have been compelled to do in this whole project. As you undoubtedly have guessed, the I.P.R. has been an invaluable source of assistance and we will certainly continue to use your help, which you have been kind enough to offer.

Sincerely yours,

For the Director, Orientation Course:

(signed) G. A. Lincoln

Major, C. E.
Director, Orientation Course
Bureau of Public Relations

COPY

The White House,
Washington

March 13, 1947

Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
120 East 62nd Street,
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Carter:

I am happy to express my interest in the continuation of the work of the Institute of Pacific Relations, which I believe is more necessary now than ever before. Several of the volumes of the Inquiry Series have been of distinct use to this office, and there have been a number of articles in Pacific Affairs and in the Far Eastern Survey which have helped us in the analysis of problems upon which we have been working.

It would be a distinct loss if these publications had to be shut down or even curtailed. I hope that in the interest of our war effort in the Pacific they may be actually expanded. I do not know of any agency inside the government or out of it which is in a position to do the work which the Institute has been doing.

Sincerely yours,

Lauchlin Currie
Administrative Assistant
to the President

November 30, 1942

Dear Professor Colegrove:

I have read with interest and some sympathy your letter to Phil Jaffe on Amerasia. I felt the same way about the treatment of India and have said so to him and to Kate Mitchell.

It seems to me that as matters now stand the editors are put in an embarrassing position by the fact that the material in the monthly issue is unsigned and therefore all the editorial board seems to take responsibility for everything that is said whether they agree with it or not and even when they haven't seen it in advance. Jaffe recognized the validity of this objection and promised to think it over. We haven't had a chance to discuss it again.

For some time I've been frankly rather puzzled as to whether to remain on the board, being torn between reluctance to sponsor the "line" being taken and on the other hand, the feeling that Amerasia had a lot of useful stuff in it. Also I dislike making any sort of break with Jaffe and Miss Mitchell both of whom are close personal friends of mine.

It may be that the whole board of outsiders ought to disappear and the magazine be made frankly the personal vehicle of the two people doing all the work. They are reluctant to have that happen. The real reason I haven't withdrawn, confidentially, is the hope that sooner or later some kind of combination could be made between Amerasia and the two IPR periodicals which would strengthen their total usefulness to the public and eliminate the present duplication and competition. From the IPR standpoint this of course would preclude a consistent and personalized editorial line though it wouldn't by any means preclude a forum of opinion presenting a variety of views. Personnel is getting so scarce that there ought to be some combination in this general field of Far Eastern periodicals. The new form of Amerasia serves really to increase the duplication and competition with Pacific Affairs and the Far Eastern Survey, particularly the former.

My own ideas aren't very clear on this and I'm writing you my puzzlement in the hope that you may have some suggestions. As a non-staff person who has been interested both in Amerasia and in the IPR, I would very much appreciate having your views as to what we ought to do.

Sincerely yours

Wm. W. Lockwood

Professor Kenneth Colegrove
105 Harris Hall
Northwestern University
Evanston, Illinois

1206

THE INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCED STUDY
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

November 20, 1942

Dear Bill:

I am sorry we opened the enclosed letter from Kenneth Colegrove, which is not on American Committee business even though it is addressed to you as secretary of the Committee.

Sincerely yours,

E.
Edward Leach

Mr. William W. Lockwood
Institute of Pacific Relations
120 East 52nd Street
New York City

P.S. Incidentally, I was pretty peeved about the review of Mackinder, which I thought fliprant.

1237

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
EVANSTON, ILLINOIS

THE COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS

105 Harris Hall
November 18, 1942

Mr. William Lockwood, Secretary
American Committee for International Studies
Princeton, New Jersey

Dear Mr. Lockwood:

I am enclosing a copy of the letter which I have just sent to Mr. Philip Jaffe, Editor of AMERASIA. I regret very much the necessity of sending this letter, but I feel that I cannot remain a member of the Editorial Board of a magazine which publishes articles severely criticizing our ally Great Britain unless those articles are scholarly in character and also unless the British side, or again the Moslem side, is also expressed on the pages of the magazine.

I suppose, anyway, it is time for me to withdraw from the Editorial Board inasmuch as living in Chicago, I cannot attend the Board meetings. I hope, of course, if the Editorial Board cannot arrange to publish some articles on the other side of the Indian question, and if I find it necessary to withdraw from the Board, AMERASIA will publish my letter of resignation indicating exactly my reason for retiring.

Hastily yours,



KC:QB

Kenneth Colegrove
Professor of Political Science

1-01

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

105 Harris Hall
November 17, 1942

Mr. Philip J. Jaffe
AMERASIA
125 East 52nd Street
New York City

Dear Mr. Jaffe:

I am writing you regarding the lack of objectivity and scholarship displayed in recent articles in AMERASIA dealing with India.

In the October 25th issue of AMERASIA occurs an article by Mr. Kurt R. Mattusch under the title of "The American Public and India" which is not only bitterly anti-British, but also unscholarly.

For instance, on page 40 he says that the debate on the Cripps Mission in the House of Lords envisaged safe reservations for British interests within India. As a matter of fact the debate of July 30 was on Europeans in India and was not on the Cripps Mission. The Marquess of Crewe, whose speech is quoted, was not an official spokesman. Mr. Mattusch completely ignores the statement of the Duke of Devonshire who speaking for the government said: "It is really impossible to make an offer both of complete self-government and to exact guarantees for specified British interests."

Again, his statement about taxes and the upkeep of Gibraltar, Malta and Eden is simply fantastic. Numerous other errors in this article could be pointed out.

I wish also to refer to the number of AMERASIA published in May and devoted to "India and the War." This number contained numerous misrepresentations that no scholar would tolerate. For instance, on pages four to eight, the onus of defeat of the Cripps Mission seems to be laid on Mr. Jinnah, who is pictured as a scheming politician. Now everyone with even a slight acquaintance with Indian affairs knows that the Working Committee of the Indian National Congress contains politicians just as scheming and selfish as Mr. Jinnah. Nevertheless, the commentator ignores this fact.

The commentary also fails to give a proper consideration to Pakistan, to explain the Moslem case, to give proper consideration to the plight of the Untouchables under the Hindu domination. It fails to call proper attention to the very small percentage of Indian people, barely ten million out of 389 million, who are politically minded. A scholarly treatment of the question should point out all these facts.

Mr. Philip J. Jaffe

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November 17, 1942

There is another consideration other than lack of scholarship in the publication of these one-sided articles and comment. We are engaged co-operatively in a war for the self-preservation of our institutions. Great Britain is our ally in this war. The publication of articles which misrepresent the facts while attacking Great Britain can do little else than impair our war effort. Loyalty to our own country requires intellectual honesty and moderation in any criticism of our ally.

I find myself under necessity of resigning from the Editorial Board unless AMERASIA is willing to publish in the very near future two articles to off-set the above mentioned anti-British articles. I would like to see this principle also applied to the editorials.

It is a matter of deep regret to me to be compelled to write to you in this fashion. There is nothing personal in my feeling in this matter. But as a teacher I cannot permit my name to be used on an Editorial Board of a magazine which prints such unscholarly and unfair articles without also publishing articles on the other side.

It is probable that in any case I ought not be on the Editorial Board inasmuch as I live so far from New York City and cannot attend the periodical meetings of the Editorial Board.

Please do not consider this letter as any ultimatum in this matter. I have nothing but the most friendly feeling toward you personally and all my colleagues on the Board.

Faithfully yours,

KC:QB

Kenneth Colegrove
Professor of Political Science

AMERICAN COUNCIL, INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC RELATIONS, INC.

HONOLULU • LOS ANGELES • MILWAUKEE • NEW YORK • SAN FRANCISCO • SEATTLE • WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 EAST 54th STREET
NEW YORK 22, N. Y.
ELdorado 5-1759

March 11, 1947

Dear Mrs. McLaughlin,

Thank you for your frank and helpful letter of February 25. I can well appreciate how the connection of Frederick Field and myself with the IPR have added to your difficulties in the Bay Region.

Without doubt an easy, though merely temporary, gain would result from a decision on his part and mine to withdraw from all official connection with the IPR.

But, alas, we are up against a vastly complicated, abundantly financed movement which is employing the classical Nazi methods in attacking liberals, leftists and middle-of-the-road conservatives.

Mr. Kohlberg is one of the spearheads of this nation-wide intrigue. He has carefully planned his time table and is moving with great skill from objective to objective. To the IPR he has added the IPA, and to that he has recently added an attack on Alger Hiss, the very able but by no means leftist successor to President Nicholas Murray Butler as the new President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Reverting to the IPR, Kohlberg's time table is roughly something like this: (1) the expulsion of Field, (2) the expulsion of Carter, (3) of Lattimore, (4) of Salisbury, (5) of Staley, (6) Mrs. Stewart, and so on. Now you may personally feel that Field, Carter, Lattimore and Salisbury should leave but I am sure you would regret as much as I would the loss of Staley. It is because of the end result rather than the fortunes of Field and myself that I am inclined to stand my ground in adhering to the invitation extended me by Sproul, Jessup, Calkins and others late in 1945: that I accept a three-year appointment as Executive Officer of the American IPA beginning in the early part of 1946.

You will remember the Bay Region Committee, when apprised of this invitation, suggested the appointment be for one year but its attitude changed to approval of the three year appointment at a meeting of the Bay Region Committee presided over by Admiral Greenslade and attended by Mrs. Rogers, Mrs. Gerbode, Julian Arnold and others. I think you will remember that Admiral Greenslade made himself the spokesman for the entire committee in saying that now that the whole picture was clear he fully supported the three-year appointment.

I am fully aware that at one stage some of the members of your committee felt that all would be well if we could eliminate Field but, subsequently, some felt that both Field and I should go. The reason why I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that I should stand my ground personally

3/11/47

is because, as I have sketched above, I know the Nazi technique of killing off its opponents aggressively one by one. I am aware also that you and a few others have had your fingers crossed on me for many years, long before my alleged redness entered the picture. I am pretty confident that these criticisms have aided the redbaiters in recommending my elimination. On all of these issues, I am quite willing to admit that I have made mistakes but I would also ask from your side that degree of live and let live that I have consistently granted to you personally. Furthermore, I hope that some day you and I can sit down alone for a couple of hours, if you have the time, to review all these matters which have worried you over the years such as: Mrs. Grady, the librarian, the Bell-Nugent textbook, our national secondary school program, etc. I do not want to defend myself or my colleagues in these matters, but I think you owe it to me to let me explain the reasons for the actions I took and, then, when you have given me your side of the picture, I know I will profit by your description of the ways in which you think I have been in error.

With reference to our invitation to you to go to Coronado, I should inform you that invitations were automatically sent to all of the 1946 National Board of Trustees and all of the candidates for the 1947 Board. You were in the first category and thus the invitation went to you with no thought that it would jeopardize the freedom of the Bay Region committee in its free choice of the Bay Region group at Coronado. We do hope that the Bay Region quota will be fully utilized and that the Bay Region committee will not feel that it must limit its selection to the quota because the 1946 and 1947 Trustees have been invited and we sincerely hope they will accept.

Sincerely yours,

Edward C. Carter

Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin
3575 Clay Street
San Francisco 18, California

copy

Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin
3475 Clay Street
San Francisco 18, California

February 28, 1947

Mr. Arthur Dean
c/o Sullivan & Cromwell
48 Wall Street
New York 5, N. Y.

My dear Mr. Dean:

In reply to your letter written me February 21st, I answer your final paragraph, "Why the inquiry which was made should have aroused great indignation. Please enlighten me...etc."

In the first place very few people have ever had a ballot like the one sent by the I.P.R. The question was about the voter's name having to be signed. I did not personally get excited about it because I knew the Foreign Policy had done the same thing. However, I have a practice of never voting for anybody that I am not sure of, and a good many women are like me in this respect. If the names presented are of people totally unknown I either do not vote, or simply sign the proxy. So much for the matter of principle.

At the present time here in San Francisco this office established twenty years ago is in danger of not getting its funds from the local community. They are not critical of it and believe in our local program, but they are very much aroused that Fred Field is on the Executive Committee of the I.P.R., considering that he is writing the type of stuff he does in THE NEW MASKS.

Now, as you probably know, nothing arouses capitalist circles' antagonism more than a person living on the fruits left to them by their ancestors going leftist. It happens that I know Field and know that he has done a good job in the I.P.R., but I am convinced that he has no place on our Executive Committee, since his present writing on the outside is so unscholarly. The local Bankers have also said that they will give us no money as long as Edward Carter is there. They feel he also is leftist. It would be simpler for me not to go into the question of why I think Mr. Carter is forfeiting his right to be the Secretary of the American Council, but you have asked me a straight question, and I feel I must answer it.

I have been with the San Francisco group since the office was opened, and I was made its local secretary and helped to start its program. During

Mr. Arthur Dean

-2-

2/26/47

those twenty years, to be brief, Mr. Carter has forfeited my trust. I feel the Institute of Pacific Relations should have a fine secretary; that Mr. Carter should depart with dignity — but should depart.

This is not retiring before Mr. Kohlberg. It is simply facing the fact that we have made a mistake to allow Field — since he has gone into the field of leftist action — to be on our Executive Committee. And to have Carter reinstated in the American Council, after he had been repudiated by the International I.P.R. The only way we can look Kohlberg in the eye and deny his accusations is to be able to prove our innocence, and I would also be just as indignant if we had a violent rightist writing scurrilous articles.

This letter will answer for at least six other people as to their reasons why we do not wish our proxies changed, i.e., my sister, Henriette Moffat, Mrs. Robert Lynch, Mrs. Edward Stanwood, Mrs. William E. Rogers, Mrs. Alfred Thurnann, etc. I have not consulted them, but I know what their sentiments were and are.

I think you made a mistake not having the proxies vote the ballots left blank. That was their method of indicating that they delegated that authority.

I would prefer that this letter (which I have written you in perfect frankness about Field and Carter) would be simply for your own information, and not to be circulated.

The Executive Committee of the San Francisco Bay Region group sent two resolutions East which tried to put in impersonal words our desires. If you care for those resolutions I will send them to you. Seattle copied them.

I might sum it all up and tell you that the emotional reaction to your letter was due to the fact that wherever there is dictatorship there is intrigue — and we have had a little bit too much of that.

I am sending this letter off the day yours came, or otherwise I would not answer it at all.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Emma M. McLaughlin

P.S. The average businessman's attitude toward Carter, I think, has been created by the fact that he has taken a curious Freudian satisfaction in insulting businessmen.

If this letter is a little incoherent it is due to the fact that I am dictating it over the telephone, and because of the years of frustration when I have not told Carter what I thought of him, and because of the anxiety that we will not be able to get our money to keep this office going.

SULLIVAN & CROMWELL

48 WALL STREET

CABLE ADDRESS "LADYCOURT"

NEW YORK

May 9, 1947.

Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin,
3575 Clay Street,
San Francisco 13, California.

Dear Mrs. McLaughlin:

I have been away in Washington or would have answered you sooner.

You may have read in the papers that Mr. Kohlberg's resolution was defeated at the special meeting by a vote of 1163 to 66. As far as I am concerned, however, and I have so stated to Mr. Carter, I still feel that the Executive Committee should make a very careful analysis of our publications and of our staff in order to make sure that we do not allow any communist bias to appear.

I shall re-examine the minutes of the Executive Committee to see if the part to which you take exception cannot be removed.

I can say to you quite frankly that I have stated both to Mr. Carter and to Mr. Field that I am not at all in sympathy with Mr. Field's writing in the Daily Worker or the New Masses and believe that we will make real progress along these lines in the near future.

I am exceedingly sorry that you still feel the way you do about Mr. Carter. He has been most successful in obtaining grants from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Foundation, and officers of Socony Vacuum Oil Company and the National City Bank have spoken very highly of him to me, as have many of the other corporation executives whom he has approached here in the East. It is, of course, always possible to offend someone.

As you know, Mr. Carter wishes to retire in a year or so and I have appointed a committee to consider his successor.

I am exceedingly sorry I could not get to San Diego and I am looking forward to seeing you soon.

Sincerely yours,

ARTHUR H. DEAN

cc: Edward C. Carter

Letterhead of:
Mrs. Alfred McLaughlin,
3575 Clay Street,
San Francisco 18, California.

April 19, 1947

Mr. Arthur Dean
48 Wall Street
New York City

My dear Mr. Dean:

Mr. Carter gave me the Minutes of the March 18th meeting, while I was in San Diego. I write to protest, not the action of the meeting, which was expected -- but certain statements as to the attitude of the Western Groups.

I haven't the Minutes before me, but wish to protest three statements.

First - that the resolutions sent were the result of the action of only a few people. The Executive Committee of the San Francisco Bay Region, and the Executive Committee of the Seattle Group both sent these resolutions. A circularization of the membership seemed ruled out because of the danger to future building of the organization here.

Second - that the opposition came from those who wished to see the office moved to San Francisco. New members of the I.P.R. frequently advocate this, but their attitude seldom persists when they have swung themselves into our local program. In justice to you I must assume that some people must have written you about this. I have searched my memory, and can remember nothing being said about this, as we discussed our resolutions.

These are the two statements which I feel should be protested, from the standpoint of the West Coast. I had hoped that a meeting of the Executive Committee would be called relative to the Minutes, but since Dr. White was in the East, and Dr. Staley is so busy with the details of forming a World Affairs Council, I send my protest.

Third - the statement which I question, is the one saying that if Field were dropped Kohlberg would just pick off some other member of the Executive Committee. Is there any other member of your Executive Committee as vulnerable as Field -- anybody to the extreme right or the left -- committed publicly on highly controversial matters?

Since Dr. Jessup has assured us of your determination to fulfill your obligations to the I.P.R., and of your fairmindedness, I feel sure that somehow we here have failed to give you a complete picture, for the reasons for our stand as recorded in the two resolutions. Since I did write you, and may have been one of those who failed, may I take the time to go into the situation again.

Dr. White and Dr. Staley were in the East when the businessmen on our Finance Committee ran up against a stone wall opposition of the Banker group. They said they would give no money as long as Field and Carter were functioning on the American Council. Our most generous business supporter felt that the thing to do was to close our office here, or skeletonize it, until Staley could come back and complete the formation of a World Affairs Council. Some of this was undoubtedly due to Kohlberg poison, but we felt we certainly did not have a clear case. Field's writing in The New Masses certainly are unscholarly and follow the "Party Line", and Mr. Carter's connection with Russian Relief was a little hard to explain.

At San Diego Mr. Carter asked me to explain who the businessmen were whom he had insulted. I felt that he had earned no right to an answer from me, but since Bill Holland felt that he had, and it was a question of a letter from Mrs. Ehrman which he quoted, I went to him and told him in that particular instance it was Alfred Isberg, our First Chairman. I think that Bill Holland feels that my recollections run back too far. I think it is a fair question to ask you whether you would not feel my statements about businessmen were based on reality when they distinctly involved our most generous supporter and our Chairman. The former ignored the Carter technique, and the latter has refused to function for several years. These are not the only people, and he may not have a Freudian complex about businessmen. It may be, as Bill Holland said, that he was simply trying to keep San Francisco from getting the main office, and it may have been at the time when he was determined to get the International Office out of Honolulu.

To sum up -- the present attitude of the business community was an accumulation of what they thought were questionable connections of Field and Carter, plus enough past experiences with the latter. I am hesitating at this point whether to give you incidences or not. I am sure you understand that the average high-minded person never even would admit that Carter's technique would bother them, and I think I haven't any right to quote people to you.

Letter from Mrs. Alfred M. Laughlin, 4/19/47)

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As for myself, since 1936 (The Yosemite Conference) I have avoided Mr. Carter, and have waited for fate to discipline a man who had an overwhelming desire for power, and was utterly unscrupulous in attaining it and using it. None of this can you believe until you have your experience. He has made a great contribution, and it is a magnificent program, worth time and energy.

I trust that this will be the last imposition on your time, so far as I am concerned.

Sincerely,

EMMA M. McLAUGHLIN

April 13, 1942

Dear Carl:

Frank Tamagna of the Research Department of the New York Federal Reserve Bank is interested in any possibility of an appointment as a consultant, though he has no intention of leaving his regular job at the Bank.

Do you know him? He is an exceedingly able young fellow, with a wide knowledge of economic affairs in the Far East, especially banking and currency. The I.P.R. is now helping him to revise and publish his book on Chinese banking - a study which is far and away the best historical and analytical account of modern Chinese banking which has yet been done.

He is Italian born and is in the process of acquiring citizenship. He holds a Ph.D. from Yale. The I.P.R. and the Rockefeller Foundation thought well enough of him to arrange for a fellowship two years ago, though he didn't actually accept it because the Reserve Bank opportunity turned up at that point.

Sincerely yours,

Wm. W. Lockwood
Secretary

Mr. C. P. Remer
Chief of Far Eastern Section
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Private
Confidential
Please return
E.C.C.

120 East 52nd Street
New York City

September 1, 1938

~~PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear P. C.:

It is a great disappointment to me that I probably won't be able to see you again before you leave. I do not expect to be in the office again until September 13 and then only for a very few hours.

As you know, my personal views, which have nothing to do with my position as Secretary-General of the Institute of Pacific Relations, have inclined me to think that Chiang Kai-shek was probably right in insisting that there must be a long continuation of resistance.

On the other hand, I realize that you will run across Chinese friends who think that some of the other Powers - for example, Italy or the United States - might bring about mediation. While you are in China, I would be enormously interested if you would write me in your personal capacity, to me in my personal capacity, to let me know how these who think mediation is called for believe that it could be brought about. Then I wish you would also send me similar answers to the following questions as well:

What would be conditions and terms for such an international mediation?

Would the Generalissimo support these conditions and terms?

What time would be considered as mature for such a mediation step?

You know I take an academic interest in all these questions, but do not let anyone in China get the idea that I am in a position to do more than study them.

Your visits to Europe and America have, to my mind, made the position of China very much clearer to a very large number of thoughtful people. I think you are to be congratulated on the very substantial results accruing from your clear interpretation. With kindest regards, I am,

Sincerely yours,

Edward C. Carter

Mr. P. C. Chang
Ambassador Hotel
New York City

13-5

OFFICERS

TELEPHONE EXBROOK 5089
CABLE ADDRESS: INPAREL

15-21

Miss Catherine ~~X~~Porter 2.

On the other hand he strikes me as having a first class mind and as being seriously interested in leaving journalism and concentrating on a long term study of the Far East, particularly as it ties up with the United States. He has recently written me as follows:

"I have been in a quandary for some months now on my future course. For the past three years I have worked at some form of journalism which, while very productive and fruitful, became more and more irksome and undesirable. I am not altogether cut out for journalism in the sense that I cannot resist going into questions more deeply and extensively than a journalist can afford. The work requires a dispersion of efforts rather than a concentration...Right now, I should like to spend a few years digging deeply."

I am writing to Draper suggesting that he get in touch with either you or Lockwood so that you can meet each other. I am not telling him definitely about the availability of these Rockefeller fellowships because for one thing I am not at all sure that he can qualify academically and for another I am not sure that you and Lockwood would support my interest in him. I am writing him merely that I should like him to know some of my colleagues so that if some opportunity arises, we can help him find the sort of opportunity he is looking for. He and Lockwood will probably not agree on a single point with regard to the Far East, but the main point I would like from you both is your general impression of him.

*adius seems to me in every respect a suitable candidate, in fact I have from the beginning put him at the top of this list. I find that he is anxious to return to more academic work after two years' experience with an investment firm and his academic record being excellent and his personality unusually favorable, there is no question in my mind but that we can secure the fellowship for him. I shall try, in his case, to obtain sufficient traveling expenses in the fellowship to permit his remaining for part of the time in the New York office and the remainder here.

This leaves Hauser and here I find myself in a rather complicated position. I need your advice badly. The job I put up to him and hired him for in September was definite and concrete. It was (a) to make an occupational analysis of the American Council members; (b) to take charge of Carter's itinerary for November and December; (c) to bring American Council work to the attention of persons whom we could later approach for money; (d) to continue preparing our press releases, and (e) to cooperate in general staff work wherever possible. The only job available in our budget was the financial one and it was therefore necessary to make it clear that he had to justify his presence on the staff with respect to that aspect of his work. Although I didn't go into this fully in New York, it was quite apparent to me that Hauser was not making himself useful with regard to (a), (b), and (c) of the above list. The work on Carter's itinerary had almost completely fallen on Hilda's shoulders and very little that I could see had been done in the direction of the other two items.

I am not blaming Hauser entirely for this because it was clear from the beginning that he was not the most suitable person in the world to find for this

1242

Miss Catherine Porter 3.

sort of work. I thought, however, that in order to insure his own place on the staff he would break his neck in making good on these tasks.

In view of the terms of his job, which I quite clearly described to him in conversation, I would have no hesitancy in telling him that the arrangement had not worked out satisfactorily and that therefore we would have to drop him from the staff at the end of December. If you and the others agree with my analysis of what he has done, I would be perfectly justified in doing this. If I do so, I should, of course, give him plenty of time to look around for something else. It is very hard for me in planning next year's budget to see how I can possibly justify adding his salary to our research expenses. I am afraid that his presence on the staff has to be in large part justified by his ability to advance our business connections. In that case, I would feel justified in putting him under the provisions of a finance secretary. I am fully aware of the fact that we need all the good people we can have on the research side, but here, unfortunately, we are strictly limited by the possibilities of our budget and these possibilities, I am afraid, we have already over-reached. Please, therefore, take this up with others on the staff and send me at your early convenience your joint recommendations.

Sincerely yours,

Frederick V. Field

Miss Catherine Porter
Institute of Pacific Relations
129 East 52nd Street
New York City, New York

FVFrB

P.S. - Please include Kate Barnes in any meeting with Draper.

FVF

November 19, 1937

Dear Fred,

This is in answer to your letter of the 9th about Foundation fellowships.

We have had a note from Draper and are planning to see him some day next week. Over the week-end, Bill is reading his material, in order to form some opinion of his ability before seeing him. We will report on him as soon as possible. Sight unseen, BL is distinctly opposed to our considering him, in view of his color and of our relationship to the Rockefeller interests. KB and I share this feeling.

As regards Hauser, we are all agreed that the job given him was in no way fitting and in no way a measure of the man's ability. He is very cooperative and pleasant in his personal relationships, and can be of service to the Survey in writing short and long articles. Our hesitation about making very concrete recommendations is our awareness of the sad condition of the budget for next year, and the uncertainty surrounding our entire program, locale, etc. We would, however, recommend that Hauser be carried on for a time on the research section of the budget, and that as soon as plans are a little more definite (presumably some time in January) he be informed whether or not it will be possible to continue him as a member of the research staff for a longer period. We are all agreed - and in this he heartily concurs - that he belongs in journalism, and he is making all possible contacts in the hope of finding a more suitable connection. I feel quite sure that he would not be interested in taking on a long-term research job if that precluded his making the kind of journalistic connection he desires.

For that reason, more than any other perhaps, it may be that we should not consider him for the Fellowship. I have not mentioned it to him, of course. He himself, however, did come to me the other day, and he brought up the subject of his future here. I held out no golden opportunity for steady association here, but assured him we would give him ample notice if the condition of the budget necessitated our dispensing with his services within a few months. At the same time I urged him to look for something else more directly in his line.

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KB would like to see new blood around here. She spoke with some appreciation of Hauser's contribution in this way, but shares the general hesitation about definitely recommending him for a long-term project. She thought Radins sounded promising. She and I are going over our files over the week-end to discover whether we have had recent applications that might be considered in connection with possible Fellowships. We will send you a list early next week.

Bill suggested that Agnes Roman (whose record I mailed you yesterday) be seriously considered - and you will note that Miriam mentions her also. Bill particularly recommended her for work on the Handbook if that project is carried out, possibly under the Fellowship assignment. He also brought up John Stewart's name. If Stewart would make the break with his present job, on the basis of a year's fellowship, with the understanding that no job would be ready here for him at the termination of that year, Bill thought it might give Stewart the break he was looking for. Uncertainty about future connections might prevent him from making the break, however. Kate Barnes felt the Fellowship might better be used in some other way, since we already have the association with Stewart and are able to use him to a large extent.

Bruno branched off into a number of suggestions. He is still plugging for a Membership Secretary whose work with the members would be a valuable means of increasing our financial returns from them. He also spoke with some feeling about the importance of getting Hull to endorse us to the people who are in a position to support our work. With regard to Hauser, whom he regards as primarily a journalist, he referred to the book which KB now has ready and which has the "enthusiastic approval" of Harcourt Brace and John Day. They are not, however, bringing it out because it would be, presumably, out of tune with the times by the time of publication. (It is in defense of imperialism, as you may know.)

Bruno would recommend an allocation of \$1,000.00 for two months to enable Hauser to finish the newspaper study, which cannot be considered in final form as it is now. He thinks KB should visit Chicago, Baltimore, Boston, and smaller cities and towns in the eastern areas, to complete the field work, to find out what the people really get out of their newspapers, etc.

BL asks also that you consider selling his own services in Seattle, Portland, or Los Angeles. He suggests a \$15,000 project - \$5,000 for his own salary and the rest for the project, setting up an office of the Institute, a center with a library with all kinds of information services, which would set going studies and study groups. He thinks Hauser's services might be sold in California, also.

For the Fellowships, Bruno brought up the name of Sosinski, whose name you could not have missed. He thinks we should consider adding to the staff someone who knows European literature, whether a Marxian or non-Marxian.

The above is not very coherent, and lacks integration and analysis and a few other things, and is not in the aggregate very helpful, I am afraid. More next week -

As ever,

CP

January 4, 1938.

SL from WWL:

IPR Representative in Washington

If, as your letter indicates, the proposal for an IPR Washington representative has come up for discussion, there are a few suggestions I might offer as to the functions which such a person might perform. Obviously it is important to have rather definitely in mind what our representative could most usefully do before laying any plans, even though it is true that a resourceful and energetic person would naturally create his own job to a large extent.

As for Washington "society," I never made much use of the black or white tie in Washington and I don't know what the possibilities really are. Doubtless there are potential contributors there, but I see little reason to suppose that we should set out to cultivate directly the elderly dowagers of Washington any more than the social set of any other city.

Nor is it likely that Washington is a particularly opportune place for a local educational program. Outside of the comparatively small circle of government people, Washington is a rather provincial town with a good deal of the lethargy of a huge bureaucracy hanging over it, and with so much "public affairs" as its daily business that it is bored with the whole thing and is rather unresponsive to lectures, dinners, discussion groups, etc.

The really important contacts in Washington are as follows:

- (1) administrative officials and legislators
- (2) news men
- (3) private educational agencies (League of Women Voters, National Council; FPA, WIL, etc.
- (4) Embassies, especially Chinese and Japanese, and Filipino delegation
- (5) universities.

It would be the job of our representative there to work with these groups, first, to extract from them the information, aid and support which they can give to our national program, and second, demonstrate the value of the IPR and of himself to them in a variety of ways.

Given our present program and set-up it should be recognized, I think, that the value of a Washington office would be somewhat limited. It would become invaluable, however, as our program develops along new lines, as it is likely to do. The present limitations in this regard are threefold. First, as long as our chief and almost sole current publication is the Survey, we have little practical use for the political information for which Washington is the preeminent source, both its officials and its news men. If we did get the hot dope from the State Department, what would we do with it?

Second, as long as our publications deal mainly with the general course of events in China and Japan rather than with the specific American angle of such events or with American affairs which have some relation to the Far East, Washington contacts are also of limited aid. Excepting for the Embassies - and this is a doubtful exception - I doubt if one can get in Washington a great deal of news from the Far East which is not available here. Its preeminence is as a source of information on what is going on in the United States, and the value of an IPR agency there would depend in part on how much we propose to concern ourselves with American shipping, investments, education, public opinion, etc.

Third, our value to the people in Washington the welcome we would receive depend on what we can give them in the way of information as to events, publications, and what not in the Far East. It would hinge on whether our contacts through our international set up enable us to offer anything of distinctive value. At present the IPR is so loosely knit and our contacts in the Far East so haphazard that we have little to offer in Washington through the continuous personal relationship which an IPR man might have there. The people there already have access to most of our sources of information and more besides. We can offer them a limited educational outlet and the support of our research program such as it is, it is true, and in this way we can enlist the interest and support of persons anxious to enlighten public opinion. On the whole, however, an IPR man starting out in Washington today would find himself in the position of going hat in hand for information and assistance rather than bringing something the people there are eager to get.

There are a good many things an IPR agency in Washington could do and it might be a swell job for someone to tackle. If there are limitations such as I have described and if they should be overcome, one way of contributing to this end would be for someone to start in down there. Some of the possibilities are as follows:

(1) The Washington bureaus - agriculture, commerce, tariff, maritime, etc. - are stuffed full of information on all aspects of American economic life and of economic developments abroad. Moreover, for most subjects of this sort with which we deal there are men who have spent their lives cramming up on the data and they are usually quite willing to cooperate with outsiders. I should say that roughly a third of the Survey should be devoted to American-Far Eastern topics and that such studies can be done in Washington better than anywhere else. One obvious function of an IPR agency, then, - although not the most important one - would be to serve as a branch of the New York research staff for the execution of certain projects. Moreover, the ideas and information picked up in Washington through this broadened contact might help to shape our whole program more realistically.

(2) Our Washington man would doubtless have to spend a great deal of time drifting around among officials, Congressmen and news men developing personal contacts and making himself a person to whom individuals might turn when an issue of Pacific relations and policy arose. (Bill Stone has done this rather successfully, especially as regards armaments and naval policy). The importance of the Washington newspaper corps ought to be emphasized in this connection. The Washington correspondents are the most influential group of reporters in the country. Moreover, they have a wide editorial leeway in their despatches. Also, they are fairly close knit and accessible as a group since their offices are practically all in one building, and since Washington is a comparatively small place. An able IPR man could make himself useful feeding them stuff, prompting various stories, securing Washington releases on IPR studies, etc.

As regards Congressmen, we should have to be quite wary. Under no circumstances do we want to engage in lobbying. By slow personal contact, however, a relationship with the IPR which is now totally lacking might be built up informally. It is not difficult to imagine that under the circumstances of the last six months this contact might be valuable. The same, I think, can be said of relationships with administrative officials, and especially with the junior group who do most of the real brain work in Washington. This part of the job ought to be thoroughly enjoyable providing it was not aimless, and in the end it would be helpful all around.

The value of such contacts with Congress, the State Department, and the correspondents would depend in part, I should think, on whether we plan to go into the field of political journalism. If we do, an agency in Washington would be just as indispensable for us as for the FPA. I doubt that we want to go very far in this direction, but as matters now stand we lack channels for effectively using the political information to be had in Washington. If we should eventually take over Amerasia or if we should start a mimeographed news sheet for American Council members, or something like that, it would be different. In any case if we expand along the lines of regional educational activities, a Washington bureau might be helpful in a variety of ways.

(3) The universities in Washington are rather poor on the whole, and there is no use looking to them for a lot of good research in our field (Brookings stands in a somewhat different category). Nevertheless, there is a good deal of educational effort in the field of public affairs and a growth of specialized training for government work. Our man might be able to associate himself with these activities through doing some teaching, taking part in discussion groups, etc., but this sort of thing would not add up to a great deal in its value to the IPR.

(4) Another minor phase of the opportunity in Washington is a closer relationship with a handful of private agencies, including the ones named above, with the Embassies, and with such offices as the ILO, etc. This need not be rated very high in the scale, for such contacts can be maintained from New York, but it would be all to the good if we had a man on the spot.

(5) One more function of the IPR representative, and doubtless a fairly troublesome one, would be to trundle foreign visitors around.

Thus the job suggests a combination of research and of contact work, both to secure and supply current information and to pick up leads for our general national program. I dare say it would be something of a gamble at the start, but it seems to be a logical step in expansion. This step is especially important - in fact, it is essential - if we are to move further and further away from a strict research program appealing only to the academic world. It goes without saying that the individual chosen for the job would have to know his onions and be able to make his way as a person; otherwise he can do us a lot of damage.

Incidentally, as a measure of economy it might be possible for the IPR representative to share the office and secretarial services of the FPA in Washington.

February 23, 1939

FVF from NWL:

In response to Escott Reid's request for references to individuals in Washington, I would suggest the following:

Alger Hiss

Roy Veatch

Joseph Jones

Stanley ~~Hornbeck~~

Bill Stone

Steve ~~Fauschenbush~~

Ernest ~~Gruening~~

Dorothy ~~Detzer~~

There are others, personal friends, of mine, to whom I would be glad to write but perhaps this is enough. If you will check the ones to whom you wish me to supply letters I will be glad to do them.

1547

February 21, 1939

MEMORANDUM TO: WHL
FROM: FVF

COPY TO: RGS

Escott Reid writes me from the Canadian Legation in Washington: "I should be most grateful for any advice that you can give me on people I should try to get to know in Washington, in order to get a line on developments in United States policies, both internal and external. The spiritual home of so many people I have met so far here is in the middle of the Atlantic that I am most anxious to meet some really representative Americans."

I have written Escott that I would consult you both and that we would send him notes to a number of people. Whom do you suggest?

f/s

Mr. [illegible]

Mr. [illegible]

Mr. [illegible]

Mr. [illegible]

Mr. [illegible]

Mr. [illegible]

Mr. [illegible]

Mr. [illegible]

Mr. [illegible]

John [illegible] - 2911 Gleason Drive
Washington, D.C. 3030 Q St. Georgetown Wash

Mr. [illegible]

AIR MAIL

New York City
September 27, 1939

Dear Margaret,

For your information you will find enclosed a brief report in which I have tried to note the progress or lack of it made in various lines and the time needed to produce during the last few weeks.

I was very lucky that the first I was able to do with Victor's word was a very lengthy long-distance telephone conversation. He could not have been more considerate but I naturally regret that I did not have a chance to get down and tell him in a great deal more detail than I could over the telephone while we were driving, etc. It turned out that he was leaving with his wife on a motor trip to the South yesterday and, incidentally, that I could not have seen him at the theatre if I had stayed over on Friday evening. Over the telephone he suggested that we get in touch with Miss Anna Sister of the Hollywood anti-Nazi League. As my end of the conversation was held from my famous New Hartford party line, I had a hell of a time getting names straight in spite of the fact that he spelled each of them out. Then you are in Hollywood, therefore, you will have to guide me like sister and see if you can get a precise reaction from any informant you can find. Anna told me to use his name in approaching this lady, that she was a close personal friend of his wife and of himself, and that she knew all the progressive people in the movie industry. He gave the impression that we could count very heavily on her. I suggest, therefore, that you call on her and find out what she has to suggest.

Victor also suggested that we get in touch with Melvin Douglas who, he tells me, is the active secretary or director of something that sounded over the phone like the Motion Picture Democratic Committee. He also suggested the Motion Picture Artists Committee in connection with which I seem to have written down two names, John Stewart and Charles Lane. All through the conversation he kept mentioning the name of Riberman -- which is very familiar but in that connection, I cannot recall. According to Anna, Riberman is mixed up in every organization in Hollywood, so that it is quite likely that he is Joe Stalin's personal representative.

Had I been talking face to face with March I could have told him that it was unlikely for organizations like ours to work exclusively through these left-wing Hollywood groups. It is quite possible that he would have realized that you have to work through them or not work at all, because they represent the only socially active people out there. You will have to find out about this on the spot. It has just occurred to me that my cousin Shirley Burden, Bill Burden's brother, is married to Douglas Fairbanks' niece -- a marriage, I may say, on which the Fairbanks family frowned but which was greeted from my end in the hopes that it would revitalize the palpably ailing household. In any case, this may be a way of getting in touch with the Fairbanks family. Burden himself has a lot of his time doing educational pictures. I am told that he is a very first-rate cameraman (incidentally, he did his apprenticeship under Marion Cooper to whom you have a letter). I have never met his wife but I am told that she is a right nice gal. I doubt if you can get money from Shirley but you might try. I imagine that his business runs something like this. Their address is 989 Second Avenue, Hollywood. Use an extra freely in trying to get after him. I haven't seen him in ten years but I think I know him and could help him. I will find you a letter from him, I think, and I will be glad to be of help.

I am sure you will find his letter to be worth in the long run. I am sure you will find it worth the trouble. I am sure you will find it worth the trouble. I am sure you will find it worth the trouble.

Sincerely yours,

Frederick W. Field

Frederick W. Field
c/o Mrs. John Field
c/o Mrs. John Field
c/o Mrs. John Field
c/o Mrs. John Field
Chicago, Illinois

Copy to Mr. Scott

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 17, 1942

Mr. W. L. Holland
Research Secretary
Institute of Pacific Relations
129 East 52nd Street
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Holland:

The Far Eastern Section of the Office of the Coordinator of Information wishes to acknowledge the assistance which it has received from the Institute of Pacific Relations and particularly from those in charge of its research activities. The outstanding example is the receipt of a number of manuscripts in advance of their publication by the Institute. These include the translation of a work by Charles Robequain on the economic development of French Indo-China, a manuscript by H. G. Callis on foreign investments in Southeast Asia, one by Virginia Thompson on Burma, and one by Chao Ting-chi on China.

This acknowledgment may be useful to you in any appeal you may make for support during the coming year. May I express the hope that your plans for the year will include provision for further cooperation with this Section. The immediate importance of this is emphasized by the fact that our own work has become more closely integrated with that of the Army and Navy.

We look forward to the continuance of the cooperation with the Institute of Pacific Relations with confidence that such cooperation will make for effectiveness in research and economy in the use of personnel.

Sincerely yours,

C. F. Remer
C. F. Remer, Chief
Far Eastern Section

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMAL CONVERSATION AT THE COMMUNIST ACADEMY,
KHOVKA 14, MOSCOW, MAY 26, 1934

The following were present: Voitinsky, Abramson, Barnes, Carter. Voitinsky served for a time in the revolutionary movement in China. Abramson studied in the university at Vladivostok, has lived in China, and speaks and reads Chinese.

1. Carter and Barnes invited Abramson to write an article for the September PACIFIC AFFAIRS on the romanization of Chinese. They invited Voitinsky to write for the December issue on the land problems of Soviet China or the land problems of China generally.

2. Discussion took place regarding the invitation which Carter and Barnes had extended to the librarian of the Communist Academy Library to prepare each quarter an eight-page bibliography of the more important books and articles written in the Soviet Union on the problems of Soviet Asia, the Far East and the Pacific. Pending conversation on May 28 between Carter and Barnes on the one hand, and the present Communist Library librarian and bibliographer on the other, it was proposed that the librarian of the Communist Academy prepare the bibliographical notes for PACIFIC AFFAIRS, but where critical appraisal of the more important books or articles was desirable, that these should be undertaken by those in the Communist Academy who, like Voitinsky and Abramson, have expert knowledge of the Far East.

3. Mr. Voitinsky said that he believed the I.P.R. could be of very great help to him in getting information and printed reports on the following subjects:

a. The inner situation in Netherlands India — the economic interdependence of the peasant and the city worker, and also the interdependence of these on capital and trade in Holland. The whole situation as portrayed in official documents in Netherlands India and in Holland would be of the greatest interest to the Communist Academy. The Academy would also welcome information on the nationalist movement in Netherlands India. At the moment the Academy has no Dutch-speaking member, but could easily get all Dutch documents translated.

b. He would appreciate all the information the I. P. R. can send him regarding the agrarian movement in Japan and the financial dependence of Japan on other countries. He would like to compare Lenin's thesis on Japan, which he feels is stated in algebraic terms transformed into arithmetical terms, through a study of finance and trade. He would like very much more information than is at present available on the evolution of the labor movement and the close relation between the village and the city. He believes that it is desirable to study the middle class of Japan, which he understands contains a large number of people who simultaneously fulfill the roles of landlord, petty manufacturer and small money lender, constituting for Japan a distinct class of "petite bourgeoisie." Freda Uhlery has done some work in this field, but Voitinsky is eager to have very much more. The Communist Academy is placing very much more emphasis on the historical background in Japan and in other countries than formerly. Voitinsky wants more studies of the Character of the Meiji Restoration (1868). Some in the Academy believe that the prevailing Japanese historical interpretation of this period is inaccurate and misleading, just as they believe that Korean history as interpreted in Japanese inspired textbooks is inadequate. They believe that this may be true of Japanese inspired textbooks in Manchoukuo.

c. Voitinsky wants both economic and historical material on the Japanese colonies.

d. Voth Voitinsky and Abramson would like copies of Rajchmann's China report to the League of Nations and in fact copies of all the material which the League has on China. They want to get a copy of an economic report made for the Nanking Government by League experts of economic and social conditions in the province of Kiangsi.

e. Abramson spoke of the difficulty of getting certain Chinese publications which are not properly listed or which for a variety of reasons have a limited circulation.

4. Voitinsky reiterated his willingness to cooperate in securing articles for PACIFIC AFFAIRS. He could see no possible objection in principle to members of the academy furnishing articles. Carter and Barnes explained that normally articles should be of four thousand words and that the standard fee for such articles was fifty dollars. They emphasized that they wished to have the Academy apply three criteria to such articles; first, that they be orthodox from the Communist point of view; second, that they are to be written by the very best authorities; third, that they be important and of general interest.

5. Carter referred to the new atlas of China which he was taking to London with a view to discovering whether an English edition was possible. Voitinsky said that an English edition would be of greater value than the Chinese edition. Carter undertook to send Voitinsky a copy of the large Chinese edition as soon as it was formally published, and also a copy of the English edition if and when published. Mr. Abramson accepted the invitation of Carter and Barnes to visit Mr. Carter's room in order to inspect the new Chinese atlas. This Mr. Abramson did.

6. Mr. Barnes in passing mentioned one aspect of the language problem of the I.P.R. and took occasion to refer to Basic English and its important role in facilitating the work of those who desire quickly to get a knowledge of normal English.

7. Mr. Voitinsky expressed interest in Lattimore's forthcoming book on the Mongols.

8. Mr. Carter expressed the hope that it might be possible for the I.P.R. to have in Moscow for a part of each year an I.P.R. representative with a knowledge of Russian who might continue to develop the interchange of books and articles which had been started by Mr. Barnes. Both Mr. Voitinsky and Mr. Abramson spoke with sincere appreciation of Mr. Barnes' helpfulness, his good command of Russian and his genuine acceptability. They promised to give the same cooperation that they had given to any qualified I.P.R. representative whom Mr. Carter might send to continue the work which Mr. Barnes had begun. Mr. Abramson agreed to accord the facilities of the library in the Academy to any fully-qualified research workers from any of the I.P.R. countries who had a working knowledge of Russian and who came with Mr. Carter's credentials.

9. Mr. Voitinsky expressed the hope that it might be possible for the I.P.R., apart from its formal publishing program, to appoint correspondents in different countries who might supplement more formal studies by individual reports. Mr. Barnes was not certain that a satisfactory system for such reports could be easily arranged.

10. Mr. Abramson indicated that on the occasion of Mr. Carter's next visit to Moscow he would like to see him and would do all in his power to facilitate the objects of his visit.

Edward C. Carter

21, 1954

Mr. Carter began by explaining that this was his third trip to the Soviet Union. On each of his previous trips, he had made every effort possible to work out arrangements for cooperation between the I.P.R. and Soviet social scientists interested in the Pacific area. The results of these efforts were by no means insignificant. The degree of cooperation actually achieved today was far higher than when he first came here in 1950. On the other hand, he was equally convinced that it did not yet begin to correspond to the volume and importance of the work being done here or of that with which the Institute is familiar outside the Soviet Union. The main purpose of his present trip was to try to improve these arrangements, if possible, through a better organization of Soviet representation in the I.P.R.

Mr. Arosev began by saying that he wished to be entirely frank and open with him. As he had told JB previously, the question was unfortunately not one simply of scientific cooperation. From what he had been able to learn of the Institute, it was obvious that it was at least in ~~part~~ large part a political institution.

Mr. Carter explained that this was only partly true. The subject matter of the Institute's research is political, but its own organization and activity is entirely non-political. The Institute is a research organization which works through the scientific bodies and workers of different countries, and must consequently take into account the political situation of those bodies and scholars, but it is not itself a political body.

Mr. Arosev replied that in the Soviet Union there were no private bodies or individuals. The nearest exception to this rule is VOKS, which is organized on the same lines as TASS, the Soviet News Agency. But even with these, we must understand, it is inevitable that any activity carried on by anyone in the Soviet Union in cooperation with other nationals has a political significance. It was for this reason that he himself was eager to straighten out the question. The inclusion of Dr. Petrov's name on the Pacific Council, whatever the misunderstanding as to his action in accepting election three years ago, was today merely an empty formality, and both sides would profit by clearing the question up. The very misunderstanding, by which Dr. Petrov feels that he accepted the position as President of VOKS while the record shows that he did so as an individual, is representative of the situation here and indicates the need for a clear understanding of the Soviet position in principle, an understanding which could be worked out only in responsible quarters when the question had the wide political significance which is inevitable in joining officially the Institute of Pacific Relations.

Mr. Carter agreed completely with the desirability of arriving at such an understanding, and stated that it was the principal reason for his visit to Moscow. He pointed out that in reality it was the substance of cooperation which interested him, and that the form or formula, although it was important to straighten out, was after all of secondary importance. The increase of direct contacts between other research institutions and those of the Soviet Union, and a wider exchange of documents and materials are the real desiderata which the Institute had in mind.

Mr. Arosev expressed his gratitude for this statement, which left him in a better position to understand the motives of the Institute. For these purposes, VOKS was the ideal organization in the Soviet Union. It is independent, it is responsible to no one and it unites in its contacts with foreign countries all the organizations of the Soviet Union in the arts and sciences.

The main question at the moment, he felt, was to secure the understanding in principle about which he had spoken. If that decision, which under the circumstances could be made only by very responsible people, should be favorable, he would find no difficulty at all, the Soviet Union. He had been in his new post only 25 days, but

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He was convinced that VOKS could be made a significant link between the Soviet Union and foreign scientists. In regard to the Institute, he and other officials had lacked hitherto any concrete idea of what the Institute wanted.

Mr. Carter stated that we are now in a position to supply such a statement in written form, if desirable, as a formal outline of the aims and objectives of the Institute and the part which the Soviet Union would be desired to play in their attainment. He wondered if Mr. Arosev would care to advise him as to the form and method of presenting such a statement.

Mr. Arosev said that he would try as quickly as possible to secure, on the basis of the large amount of information which they now had as a result of our visit, a definite ruling on the question in principle. He hoped to be able to secure this by May 26th, when he wished we would telephone him. Then we could submit such a concrete statement as we had mentioned, and he could guarantee that if the decision in principle should be favorable, we would find every aid and cooperation in carrying out our plans.

Mr. Carter then described in some detail the history of the Institute's relations with the Soviet Union. In 1929, through the warm interest of Commissar Litvinov, Mr. Alexandre Kozlov of TASS was sent to the Kyoto Conference as an observer. In 1931, Vice-Commissar Karakhan spoke with cordiality of the research work of the Institute, and of the keen interest in it which was felt by Soviet scientists, and assured a responsible group of Institute representatives that individual cooperation on the part of Soviet scientists was entirely acceptable to the government authorities. At that time he recommended that VOKS be used as the agency, and in the same year Dr. Petrov who was then President of VOKS accepted his election to the Pacific Council of the Institute. This formal representation of the Soviet Union in the Institute had not developed as might have been hoped. In other ways, however (Mr. Carter referred to JB's presence in Moscow for the past two months, the survey he had made of research societies in the Soviet Union, and to the last number of Problemyi Kitaya, which contains the translation of an I.P.R. data paper) we have been successful in working out larger and more fruitful cooperation than we have ever had before.

He concluded by repeating his assurances that he was only too eager to conform to any suggestion which might be forthcoming as to the formula of cooperation. He would wait until the 26th for the decision which Mr. Arosev had promised, particularly since he planned to be in Moscow again in the fall.

JB added personally, since he knew Mr. Arosev from a previous meeting, that he wished to assure him that the invitation was by no means a political gesture. The persistence and zeal of Institute representatives in Moscow in attempting to work out some answer to this problem reflected no desire on the part of any nation or group to use the Soviet Union for political purposes. It reflected rather our increasing conviction of the importance of Soviet studies, as witnessed by the fact that some of us have learned the Russian language and spent considerable periods here, and also to some extent the impossibility of securing any sort of really definite answer from Soviet authorities. If Mr. Arosev could secure a definite answer, even if it should be negative, it would probably be an assistance to the substance of what we want to secure.

Mr. Arosev, concluding, assured Mr. Carter that he had no desire to continue "feeding us with empty promises." While we were here, we should feel free to command VOKS in any way possible. If the answer is in the affirmative, VOKS will officially bend every effort to advance our projects here. If it is in the negative, however, VOKS will still be only too happy to help us in any way possible that does not commit it to our policies. He reminded us that it would be hard to convince anyone in the

Soviet Union that the Institute is not political. Any organisation in which England, Japan, China and the United States are working, because of the delicate relations between those countries, is of necessity political. In this case, political significance is like the fat in which a ~~meat~~ outlet is fried. It may be butter fat, or sunflower seed oil, but you can't fry a outlet without fat.

Mr. Arosev took a list of Banff Conference members, and asked a few additional questions concerning the central headquarters of the Institute and the role of Pacific Council members. He had already been given a pretty complete sheaf of documents, including Pacific Affairs, a list of A.C. members, Empire in the East, a check list of publications, the Harvard Summer School circular, etc.

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a full-rate Telegram or Cablegram unless its deferred character is indicated by a suitable symbol above or pre-

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1223

SYMBOLS

DL = Day Letter
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RESPECTFULLY AND URGENTLY INVITE YOU TO AUTHORIZE SOME MEMBERS OF SOVIET EMBASSY WASHINGTON AND SOVIET LEGATION OTTAWA TO ATTEND EIGHTH CONFERENCE INSTITUTE PACIFIC RELATIONS MONT TREMBLANT PROVINCE QUEBEC DECEMBER FOUR TO FOURTEEN STOP INFLUENTIAL LEADERS COMING FROM ENGLAND CHINA FIGHTINGFRANCE PHILIPPINES NETHERLANDS AUSTRALIA NEWZEALAND CANADA UNITEDSTATS STOP E VARGA G VOITINSKY CONSTANTINE OUMANSKY V MOTYLEV FAMILIAR WITH INSTITUTE PURPOSES STOP CONFERENCE AGENDA INCLUDE BETTER PROSECUTION OF WAR IN RACIAL POLITICAL ECONOMIC MATTERS CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS WILL BE PRIVATE =

EDWARD CARTER =

SECRETARYGENERAL INSTITUTE PACIFIC RELATIONS
129 EAST 52 STREET = NEWYORK

1240

Wednesday, Dec. 10, 1941.

Dear Mr. Carter:

Mrs. Blow asked me yesterday to recommend a Chinese American citizen for a U.S. Information Service position. This job may not be very important. But since America is now in war and the situation in China is now too ideal, I feel it my duty to both China and America to consider the proposition in all seriousness.

I think you have read despatches about the contents of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's messages to the British Prime Minister and the American President. Chiang himself admitted the strength of the pro-German and pro-Japanese elements within his immediate circle. This revealing message verifies all the warnings and alarms sounded by both Chinese and American progressives for many months. Recent despatches in Chinese by Chen Han-chen's news service in Hongkong told of how in anticipation of German entrance to Moscow before the Russian Revolutionary Anniversary Chiang held a secret conference in which an entire plan for China to end the war with Japan and line up with the axis was passed out to be first imposed upon the KMT plenum and later upon rubber stamped by the People's Political Council. Only when the "military expert" saw that Moscow was not in danger of immediate conquest that the political council was called first instead of the KMT plenum and the capitulatory plan was temporarily shelved. Mark ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ A more recent despatch told about an authenticated account about President Lin Sen's refusal to sign the appointment of a notorious corrupt provincial governor to an important cabinet position as a prelude to a reorganization of the government to conclude the war. Lin Sen was scheduled for resignation, Chiang was to be kicked up stairs into his shoes and Wang Minister Ho Ying-ching -- you must know who this gentleman is -- was to ~~XXXXXX~~ succeed Chiang as the premier. Such being the unsavory news, it can be reasonably inferred that ~~Chiang~~ even Chiang was forced to ask U. S. and British aid to save himself from an infamous end and the messages indicate his efforts along this line. It is also reasonable to infer that it was Chiang himself who "leaked out" the contents of his messages to foreign press to beat off the attacks upon him by the pro-Japanese Frankenthings. All this indicates the serious situation in the Chinese sector of the ~~XXXXXX~~ world-wide democratic front. America, now positively, formally and actively in an all-out war, must be careful in selecting people to act as eyes and ears regarding the Chinese front, even though the role may be a minor one.

I don't know how much Mrs. Blow understands about the Chinese background. I have told her of the precarious situation within China, but I don't know whether she ~~has~~ has been sufficiently impressed. Anyway, I have been trying to think of some person who is a patriotic American of Chinese descent with active interest in defending democratic institutions in America, China and throughout the world and with no connections with the present ruling cliques in China, nor ~~subliminal~~ anticipations of favors from them.

This morning I called up Mrs. Blow and asked her whether she

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had already gotten some recommendations. She said Lin Yu-tang recommended a Mr. ~~X~~ who now in the Chinese government news service. I don't know Mr. ~~X~~ very well, but I asked her to consider his government connection. However, she said this person should be all right if he is connected with the Chinese government. Moreover, she thought Lin Yu-tang should be a good reference. All these indicate how difficult it is to make one appreciate a serious situation when there is no general knowledge of the background. Lin is an unofficial envoy of Chiang whose special duty is to whitewash the dangerous situation within China and to draw America into war. I don't think it ever occurs to him to consider the safety of America. And, though he may appreciate the democratic institutions and comfortable living in this country, I don't think he is extraordinary anxious to see democracy prevail in China. He is a taoist and prefers to let things drifting in its natural course and there ~~be~~ no consequences which are undesirable to a taoist. Since they are there, they must be good. For practical Americans to rely upon the advice of people with such easy-going, opportunistic philosophy of life is very dangerous.

For my part, I recommended a Mr. ~~X~~ Chiu-tang, an experienced journalist educated first in this country, then China and later returned to U.C. for graduate work. He may not be the only person, but he is absolutely reliable ~~and~~ if America really intends to strengthen China as an ally in this all-out war. I am not asking ^{you} to put over my recommendation. I do ask you, however, to help Mrs. Blow to understand the importance of the internal situation in China and to guide her recommendations to the ~~Department~~ Information Service in the light of this understanding.

I must apologize for this letter as you must be very busy. But since I am asked by Mrs. Blow for help, I want to render that help in the most dutiful and conscientious manner and I am sure a few words from you is worth a book written by me to bring Mrs. Blow around to our view point.

With best wishes,

Respectfully Yours

[illegible]

Department of State
Washington

C O P Y

March 26, 1940

Dear Mr. Carter:

In the matter of American officers (I suppose that means Army and Navy officers) who might have sound views on the political significance of the Japanese Army, I suggest the following three:

Colonel William Carey Crane, Fort Myer, Virginia.
Captain Maxwell D. Taylor, 2038 Allen Place, N.W., Washington, D.C.
Commander Henry Smith-Hutton, Naval Attache, American Embassy, Tokyo.

It would be difficult for me to indicate these men in order of competence because in my opinion each of them has certain merits that the others do not. Commander Smith-Hutton has had exceptional training and experience both in Japan and China to make his comments valuable. Captain Taylor is a brilliant young officer who has, of these three, had most recent experience with Japanese troops. Colonel Crane has served as Military Attache in Tokyo and had earlier experience in Japan in addition. The addresses which I give are their present addresses.

Major General F.S.G. Piggett, until recently Military Attache of the British Embassy at Tokyo, but at present in England I believe, could give comments on the subject in an entirely different light. You perhaps know him and know that his sympathy is markedly favorable to the Japanese. He was born in Japan and has a good background of information in spite of his bias.

I am engaged, as opportunity offers, in going over and briefing for Dr. Hornbeck the studies of the Institute of Pacific Relations which have to do with our work here. You kindly sent Dr. Hornbeck a number of the studies, but they have become separated by reason of some being placed in the library and some being retained in various of the Divisions particularly concerned. It would be a great convenience and a great courtesy to me if it should be possible for you to send to me one complete set of the Institute of Pacific Relations' studies. If this is too much of an order to be practicable, please overlook the suggestion; I can, of course, attempt to do some gathering of the scattered copies already here and piece them out by requesting individual studies which we do not have.

I began work here at the Department in December, succeeding to the place left vacant by the unexpected transfer of Salisbury to Manila. It is a pleasure to be here in Washington, and I hope you will drop in at my office when you are in the city.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) Cabot Ceville

HA

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Washington, D.C.

June 12, 1945

Dear Mr. J. Edgar Hoover:

Your letter of the 5th instant has been received. The subject of the possibility of an American East Canada Council would be discussed at the meeting of the Council.

Regarding the letter, I think an interesting consideration will be the point of view as to the psychological time for getting the East Council. I know that one chance of getting people from the British Isles will be before the meeting in September. I think the matter of British representation with American has been. He is deeply interested in the Pacific and very sympathetic of the work, but he says that this summer he is going to be working on the way to get across to leave the British Isles. However, he is not yet prepared to be the winning of the war. In the meantime, as you say, this summer is the critical period. I believe he has the greatest difficulty in getting over adequate staff for this reason. In the official side he has this year, American people from government and private agencies have to get over themselves. The Congress, the Red Army Chorus, etc., and though he has got tremendous pressure on them people to come over and help in the task of building up America's war effort, the Council he has had absolutely no success. He has made to leave the British Isles now. In spite of this I do not continue the possibility of Taylor or Fitch being coming, but all the indications point to Fitch being much better than September.

As to the possibility of our getting a really significant group of people in all short a time as three months, I believe that we can certainly get in good a personnel from the Pacific Area for a September Conference as we got for the Atlantic Area at Frost's Peak last year, but I think we will want to attempt an even higher level for the EAC than we had for the Atlantic Conference. Of course, of course, Canada, because we could not think of a better group for the EAC than that you mobilized for Frost's Peak.)

^{William}
Last week in Washington, D.C. and I made some dealings with reference to Wallace and Fitch. High up both of them have to watch their step because of the very delicate relations between the Board of Economic Warfare and the State Department. The Department is known by the public to be a little concerned about the activities of the EAC, and I don't believe the Board that neither Wallace nor Fitch make in the least for work to do anything that would aggravate this situation.

And here is one of the critical problems faced by the American Council. Many thoughtful Americans believe that there is more constructive thinking in American Reconstruction in the EAC than in the State Department. They would hope that the lead in the proposed Conference, from the American point of view, would be taken by Wallace and Fitch and some of their very able staff members. Certain foreign office people from other countries might be more eager to meet Wallace and Fitch than some of the more routine people in the State Department. To get immediately secure the presence of some State Department people if that seems wise to the officers of the Pacific Council, but it would be difficult to manage at the moment.

[illegible]

DATE

[illegible]

THE

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 31, 1940.

Dear Mr. Carter:

I have your letter of May 29.

With regard to Miss Virginia Thompson's manuscript of her book on Siam (Thailand) I doubt whether there is any need or whether we could undertake to read the manuscript before publication. However, we shall be glad to discuss the matter with Miss Thompson and I have therefore not sent any telegram to her suggesting that she not call. We appreciate the thought which prompted you and Miss Thompson to wish to give us the opportunity to go over the manuscript.

With regard to Miss Thompson's desire to go to France to continue her work for the Institute of Pacific Relations, I shall of course be glad to put her in touch with the appropriate officer in the Passport Division.

Sincerely yours,

W. A. R. Hamilton

Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street,
New York, New York.

Copy to VT

129 East 52nd Street,
New York, N.Y.

29th May, 1940.

Dear Hamilton,

Two years ago you very kindly responded to the invitation of the Institute of Pacific Relations and gave Miss Virginia Thompson the privilege of studying some of the State Department reports on Siam. This was of great assistance to her in the preparation of the book on Siam which she is writing for the Institute of Pacific Relations.

She has now completed the manuscript and would like to go to Washington to hand it to you so that you or one of your assistants may read it with a view to making absolutely sure that the confidence that you gave her has in no way been violated.

As I remember it, neither you nor any of your assistants requested the privilege of seeing the manuscript before publication, but it seems to Miss Thompson and me that it was a very much better procedure for us to give you the opportunity of seeing it, even though no references to State Department sources are mentioned except, of course, what is already available to the public generally.

A little later I will be asking you to use your good offices in commending Miss Thompson to the appropriate officer in the Passport Bureau to return her passport in order that in a few weeks she may return to France to continue her work for the Institute of Pacific Relations. She is a member of the International Secretariat of the I.P.R. and is acting as liaison officer between the Secretariat here and the French National Council of the I.P.R.—Comite d'Etudes des Problemes du Pacifique. The studies which the Institute is making of war and post-war problems make it necessary for us to have a member of the Secretariat in residence in France in close touch with French scholars and French public opinion and the principal personalities of the Comite d'Etudes des Problemes du Pacifique.

Unless you wire to Miss Thompson on Friday to the Mayfair House, Park Avenue & 65th Street, New York, that it is impossible for you to see her on Monday, June 3rd, she will ring your office about ten o'clock on Monday morning to discover when during the day you will have a few minutes to see her.

Sincerely yours,

Edward C. Carter

Maxwell S. Hamilton, Esq.,
State Department,
Washington, D.C.

Handwritten:
Holland
Bristol
November
Amsterdam

Stamp:
EARL H. LEAF

[Faint, mostly illegible printed text, possibly a letter or document fragment.]

[illegible]

...the Japanese... finally the...
...foreign consular and shipping...
...doubt that...
...Japanese...
...shipping is...
...the military supply...
...troops have been...
...in Chinese cities under attack and...
...not permitting military establishments...
...of occupation forces have...
...orders about...

...are... that Japanese...
...never allow themselves to be...
...interviewed...

Freedom of Correspondence: Personal relations between...
...the Japanese are... but the Japanese try...
...the way of correspondence is... as...
...giving elaborate...
...gratifying favored correspondents...
...service is provided...
...have access to...
...cultivated socially by the high...
...military and civil officials. An example of free...
...from Hankow...
...free rides on...
...elaborate facilities...
...certain correspondents...
...entry into Hankow...
...A. Morgan...

Chinese Navy: Correspondents get Chinese news at Shanghai through...
...from indirect sources and translated from local...
...Most of the foreign correspondents at Shanghai who have been...
...the country as a vast mystery land, tend...
...little knowledge upon...
...which to estimate Chinese...
...translations with information from...
...There are few resident...
...with direct knowledge and the are...
...inclined to be as...
...as the correspondents.

Censorship: The Japanese censorship at Shanghai is not very strict...
...of great...
...attacks on...
...by Japanese...
...There was an official...
...transmitted the news...
...but infrequently...
...at Hankow and...

129 East 94th Street,
New York, N.Y.

20th January, 1933.

Dear Jaffe,

This is to express the hope that you and Mrs. Jaffe will attend the opening of an Arctic exhibition at the Natural History Museum on Sunday, February 5th at 3:30 p.m. under the auspices of the American Russian Institute. Stefansson, the great explorer, and Ommensky will both speak. The exhibit is on a very important subject. I will send you the details later.

Sincerely yours,

Edward S. Carter

Philip J. Jaffe, Esq.,
49 East 9th Street,
New York, N.Y.

1352

On board
S.S. Aqueduct

July 11, 1938

Dear Jaffe:

All around the coast of Asia and Europe I picked up highly complimentary remarks with reference to Amerasia. Someday I would like to sit down with you and some of your colleagues and run over the whole question of promotion overseas. Copies ought to be in the reading rooms of the Consulate, British, American and French Embassies and Legations in Tokyo, Chungking, Shanghai, Bangkok, Paris, London, Moscow, The Hague, Ottawa, Canberra, Rome, Berlin and Brussels. Says and means should be discovered for substantial increase in the circulation in Japan, China and Great Britain. Kotylev wishes that Pacific Affairs carried as essential information as that which he discovers invariably appears in your section "Economic Notes." Kotylev also likes the consistently high and quality that characterizes almost every issue of Amerasia and which appears so clearly, according to Kotylev, in everything that Fred Field writes whether in Amerasia or elsewhere. If Amerasia and AMCO merge the prestige of both will be enhanced in several countries.

Do you suppose the Amerasia free list could stand sending a complimentary copy for a year to Murray G. Brooks, Y.M.C.A., Rangoon, Burma. He is working for the re-education of certain Burmese members of Parliament who are obstructing the Burmese government's efforts to facilitate cultural and material communications between Burma and China. He is facilitating a Burmese vernacular translation of Vesper's "Secret Agent of Japan."

Hoping you can come to Sunset Farm for a long talk sometime before September, I am

Sincerely yours,

Edward C. Carter

Mr. Philip J. Jaffe
120 East 52nd Street
New York City

amerasia

A REVIEW OF AMERICA
AND THE FAR EAST
125 EAST 52nd ST. NEW YORK
TELEPHONE: PLAZA 8-4700

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July 19, 1939


Mr. Edward C. Carter
Institute of Pacific Relations
129 East 52nd Street
New York City.

Dear Mr. Carter:

Thanks a lot for your report on the influence that Amerasia is having in Asia and Europe. Your suggestions for spreading the magazine through the many reading rooms that you mention will be acted upon quickly. We have also entered a complimentary subscription for Mr. Brooks, at Rangoon.

There is a good deal that I would like to talk with you about and I would be more than happy to accept your invitation for a long talk at Sunset Farm. In the meantime, we may have an opportunity for a talk in New York.

Sincerely yours,



Philip J. Jaffe

1364

BIRCHFIELD
NORFOLK, CONNECTICUT

4/2/58

Dear Mr. Carter:

I accept eagerly and
gratefully for Wednesday the
20th. Many thanks.

Sincerely yours,

Thy C. Jung

129 East 52nd Street
New York City

March 31, 1938

Dear Jessup:

Would you be interested in dining with me and a few others at the Century Club at 7:15 on the evening of Wednesday, April 20th, to listen to a hundred-percent Bolshevik view of the Moscow trials? I have invited Constantine Goumansky, the able, two-listed Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, to come to New York that evening to speak to a little dinner of a dozen of my friends and then submit himself to the frankest questions that any of my guests care to put.

If it is possible to accept, I can promise you a provocative and interesting evening.

Sincerely yours,

Edward C. Carter

Professor Philip C. Jessup
Norfolk
Connecticut

4472
The attached report, compiled and written
by the Shanghai branch of the British Army Intelli-
gence Service, is STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL.

It is well worth a careful study, however,
as providing a means of estimating the actual num-
ber of casualties when studying the official Japan-
ese casualty reports.

Earl H. Leaf

JAPANESE CASUALTIES

1. Although it is difficult to do more than a rough approximation, the following attempt has been made to assess the Japanese casualties incurred from the outbreak of the LUKOUCHIAO Incident on July 7th, 1937, to about the middle of November, 1938, a period of over 16 months of hostilities.
2. The official Japanese Army figures of killed in action are as under:
 - (a) up to about mid-Nov. 1937
North China: Approx. 6,500
Central China: " 10,000
 - (b) up to 7th July, 1938 - nearly 37,000 on all fronts. Between mid-November, 1937 and July, 1938, most of the heavy fighting had occurred on the North China Front, in SHANTUNG, especially TAIERCHANG, in SHANSI, and North HONAN. It is suggested that this figure of 37,000 might be sub-divided into 19,000 North China: 18,000 Central China.
 - (c) during HANKOW advance from about the middle of August to the middle of October: 6,153.

This would give, with an admitted South China casualty list of 77, a grand total of 43,000 killed. It would appear reasonable to add another 2,000 to represent "official" casualties in North China subsequent to 7th July, 1938, and "official" casualties in Central China other than those incurred during the HANKOW advance as stated above.

It is suggested, therefore, that the official figures to date would be in the neighborhood of 45,000 killed, of which not less than 25,000 will have been incurred in Central China.

3. (a) These figures suffer from two defects. In the first place they are "official" lists, and in the second place they do not, it is understood, include those died of disease. They may be considered to be a serious understatement of the true state of affairs.

(b) As regards the accuracy of the "official" lists, it is a fact that the "official" casualties at the CHANGKUFENG Incident in July - August, 1938, were given at 158 killed. Later lists of killed, by name, gave a total of 523 (see Summary No. 42). A greater proportion of casualties were probably suppressed on this occasion than is usually the case (the true casualties being over 200% more than the official ones), as there were particular reasons to emphasize how gallantly and successfully the Japanese had resisted the Russians.

It is also of interest to record that continuous reports have been received of the number of ashes evacuated through TANGKU and that these reports give a total, up to the end of October, of over 60,000. These ashes will certainly include died of disease and probably also civilians, but even allowing for a 50% exaggeration, the subsequent total of 40,000 is twice the "official" total of 20,000. Figures for SHANTHAI and TSINGTAO are not obtainable, but the impression gained from the reports of ashes arriving in Japan fortifies the belief that the dead are very considerably greater than is officially announced.

It is suggested that the numbers killed in action are about 60% above those officially admitted, and that they are probably over 70,000.

(c) Figures of "deaths from disease" are more difficult to estimate, but the following information is of assistance:-

- (i) The Japanese admitted to 300 deaths from cholera near Shanghai in August and September, 1937, and to outbreaks of cholera up the YANGTZE this summer, especially at KIUKIANG. Their admission of cholera deaths near SHANGHAI is probably an under-statement.
- (ii) The South Manchurian Railway, who have been operating certain railways in North China for some months, have announced the deaths of 28 Japanese employees from disease. The number of Japanese S.M.R. employees in North China is not known: it is suggested an average over the period under discussion may be about 2,000.
These figures, taken by themselves, must not be pressed too far, as many of the 28 deaths might have occurred in one isolated outbreak of disease in one isolated area, and the total of 2,000 Japanese S.M.R. employees may be an under-statement. On the other hand, it must be remembered that these civil employees will usually be working under conditions making them both less liable to serious disease, and, with better treatment more quickly available, more likely to recover, if attacked.
- (iii) Other factors to be borne in mind are the reported 60,000 ashes from TANGKU, which will have included deaths from disease, the admitted prevalence of dysentery both in North and Central China, the bitter cold faced in the winter of 1937-38, which undoubtedly caused frost-bite, pneumonia, and other serious winter ailments, and the almost tropical conditions of the summer fighting in the YANGTZE this summer.

(d) It is suggested that the deaths from disease in the Japanese Army in China may be taken as something under 10,000, and that the total number of deaths from all causes is some 80,000 men.

4. (a) The numbers of "seriously" wounded and sick must also, to a considerable extent, be a matter of conjecture, and it is difficult to draw an exact line between "serious" and "slight" cases. It is intended that "serious" cases should cover not only men permanently incapacitated for military service but also, generally speaking, all those whose absence from duty is about 3 months or more and who, therefore, have a serious effect on the fighting strength of the Army.

(b) It is understood that as a result of the experience of the Great War a proportion of 4 wounded to 1 killed may be expected in action. Of these 4 wounded, 1 will be able to walk in a Walking Wounded Collecting Centre and the other 3 will have to be helped or carried by stretcher. The 1 walking wounded can probably be taken as a "slightly wounded", and a small percentage of the 3 non-walking wounded may also be only "slightly" wounded, the nature of the wound preventing walking.

It is possible that in the present war in China, with most Japanese casualties being caused by comparatively cleaner and less serious bullet wounds, that the proportion of "slightly" wounded is higher than it was in France, and it is suggested, therefore, that the number of "seriously" wounded will be about 140,000.

(c) The number of "seriously" sick will, of course, bear a higher proportion to died of disease than wounded to killed.

Cholera, dysentery, beri-beri, pneumonia, frost-bite, all causing a high degree of "serious" wastage, have been prevalent at different times among the Japanese forces. The immediate "serious" wastage from venereal disease has probably not been high, though the ultimate loss is bound to be serious in view of its widespread existence in the Japanese army and the little or no preventive measures taken. Malaria has obviously caused a very high immediate wastage, but it is possible that its "serious" wastage (i.e., over 3 months absence from duty) is less than dysentery, which has probably been the chief scourge to the Japanese troops. There have also probably been a not-inconsiderable number of "heat" diseases from the summer campaigning in the YANGTZE Valley.

It is suggested that the number of "seriously" sick will be about 60,000.

(d) These two figures give a combined total of 200,000 "serious" casualties, wounded and sick.

Owing to the Japanese using, quite legitimately, hospital transports as well as hospital ships for the evacuation of wounded and sick, it has not been possible to obtain data of movements of hospital vessels from China, as the hospital transports are not recognizable as such. Two facts, however, have recently become known from the journey of certain foreign newspapermen up the YANGTZE in October, tending to confirm the above estimate.

The first fact is connected with a visit paid to the Japanese Army YANGTZEPOO Clearing Hospital, SHANGHAI. This is not the only Japanese Army hospital in SHANGHAI, but it is believed to be now the principal one in existence. During the SHANGHAI fighting there were, of course, several others. Sick and wounded from SHANGHAI area and from HANGCHOW are evacuated to these SHANGHAI hospitals. Sick and wounded from upriver are evacuated to hospitals at NANKING and KIUKIANG, etc., and thence moved direct to Japan. It will thus be seen that this YANGTZEPOO Hospital, though an important one, only deals with a proportion of the Army casualties in Central China. On the occasion in question when the foreign journalists were being conducted round, the O.C. Hospital admitted that since the opening of the hospital in September, 1937, 60,000 patients had been dealt with, of whom 40,000 had been evacuated to Japan.

The second fact is connected with the visit of the foreign journalists to KIUKIANG a few days later. There, the KIUKIANG Army Hospital was full, with a total of between 2,000 and 3,000 patients. It was estimated that about 60% were "sick" and 40% "wounded." The chief sicknesses were dysentery, malaria and beri-beri.

The final suggested figures of Japanese Army casualties in China are therefore 280,000 wounded or sick. These figures are considered reasonable, though it is possible that the proportions between one class of casualty and another may need alteration.

The Japanese Navy admitted to 1,100 killed on July 7th, 1938. On a comparable basis, with loss of Naval aircraft and with Naval landing parties operating up the YANGTZE, the Naval casualties may be assessed as 2,000 dead and 5,000 seriously wounded or sick. It is suggested that, to cover possible over-assessment, the Naval casualties are considered as included in the Army losses suggested above.

-4-

JAPANESE CASUALTIES

In Summary No. 44, page 8, it was estimated that the "official" Japanese Army total of killed in China between July 7th, 1937 to about the middle of November 1938 would be "in the neighbourhood of 45,000." The official figures, published on December 26th, 1938, for the period 7th July, 1937 to 30th November, 1938 are given as 47,133 officers and men "killed in action or succumbed to wounds."

It is considered that this higher figure tends to confirm the totals suggested in the article in question of 80,000 Army and Navy killed, died of wounds, died of disease, and 200,000, seriously wounded or sick. There have also been various small additional incidents confirming the belief that the "official" casualties have been greatly under-stated. Such incidents are:

(a) An account in the "OSAKA MAINICHI" of the wastage from disease among the reporters of that newspaper with the forward troops. It was stated that "more than 80" reporters had to be withdrawn "to the rear" on account of ill-health. It is also of interest that Lt.-General TOKUGAWA, C. G. C., Air Force in China, was evacuated to Japan in December 1938, suffering from typhoid.

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(b) A photograph in the JAPAN ADVERTISER of 34 members of the Metropolitan Police Board, TOKIO, killed or died of disease in China.

(c) The arrival of very large numbers of ashes in Japan at the end of December. On one occasion 1821 ashes were received at TOKIO and about a similar total at KOBE or OSAKA.

In this connection, reports from TIENTSIN state that during the two months November and December, 1938, 4550 ashes were embarked at TIENTSIN, making the estimated grand total of ashes despatched from that port about 65,000.

(d) The large number of people met in Japan who had lost relatives in China,

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THE ANNALIST

A Journal of Finance, Commerce and Economics
Published weekly by The New York Times Company

Times Square, New York

July 15, 1940.

Mr. Edward C. Carter,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East 52nd Street,
New York City.

Dear Mr. Carter:

I want to thank you belatedly for the draft copy of Mr. Lattimore's forthcoming article in Pacific Affairs. I read it with a great deal of interest, and found it decidedly stimulating.

May I add in a friendly spirit, however, that the first part seemed to me not wholly lucid. If this possibly is in part due to the facts that my knowledge of Far Eastern affairs is relatively superficial, and that I have not been a regular reader of Pacific Affairs and therefore not thoroughly familiar with the author's point of view, which here he has probably over-condensed (and I am not convinced that this is the whole explanation), nevertheless such an article ought to be fairly complete in itself, and not leave one puzzling over the implications of some of the writer's statements.

I wish I could see the United States taking a more positive stand in the Far East, such as that co-operation with Russia recently recommended by Mr. Bisson, as well as directly, towards China and Japan. I am afraid, however, that we are likely to continue to follow what is essentially a do-nothing policy.

Sincerely yours,

Winthrop W. Case
Winthrop W. Case

1362

Co. B - 30th Bn.

Armored Force R.T.C.

Fort Knox, Kentucky.

Fred. V. Fields (or Dep't of Publication)
Institute of Pacific Relations
129 East 52nd Street, NYC.

Sir:

I am a Lincoln Brigade Vet, who participated in guerrilla warfare in Spain from 1937 to the fall of Barcelona.

At present, I am a private in the Armored Force. I am greatly interested in adding some the tactical employments of the guerrilla methods (i.e.: commandos) to our armory of ideas.

Maj. Evans Fordyce Carlson, who once spoke to us, is the author of a book on the Chinese Guerrillas which the Secretary of the Vets tell me has some good material on organization.

Therefore, I would greatly appreciate it if you or your publications office could see its way clear to sending me a copy, gratis.

If not, could you send me copy c.o.d.
I'll send you the material (outside of my
opinion notes) to try and get my ideas across?

Also, is Maj. Carlson's address,
available to you? I should like to contact
for advice.

In order to assure you of the
bona-fidencess of my plea, I refer you to
Nov. 1941 issue of Soviet Russia Today,
or to the Veterans of Lincoln Brigade
New York Office, 77 Fifth Ave.

Yours Respectfully.

Pat. Wm. Aalto

P.S. - As we may be transferred shortly,
would appreciate hearing from you as
quickly as possible.

AMERICAN COMMITTEE
FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY

July 2, 1940

Mr. Edward C. Carter
Institute of Pacific Relations
129 East 52nd Street
New York, New York

Mr.
Dear Carter:

In answer to your note of June 26 the Chatham House research memorandum was passed along by Miss Walker as confidential and you had better check with her on the possibility of using it in I. P. R. notes. Even though the memoranda was dated June 7 it is inconceivable that most of that stuff is really being pushed along under present circumstances. It reminds one of the story that the British officers took or were planning to take their polo ponies to Norway. Even so, isn't it likely that Chatham House would not want a good deal of the memoranda reproduced in I. P. R. notes at present?

In further answer to your note it is unlikely that the A. C. I. S. will act on either of Staley's suggestions. The idea of an elaborate, formal research series directly under Committee auspices was rejected last fall in favor of a more decentralized, informal procedure. It is unlikely to be revived now. Also, no one wants to take on the job of launching a new journal of international studies and it is very questionable whether there is any need to do so. Don't you agree that most of the good periodical stuff (and a good deal besides) finds a ready channel of publication? Earle and I do have in mind, however, issuing a series of informal news letters as occasion seems to require.

Speaking of journals, I ventured an emphatic opinion in conversation with Margaret Taylor that the time had come to throw Amerasia, Pacific Affairs, and probably the Far Eastern Survey into the pot in order to create a new American Council -- Pacific Relations monthly, which would meet the interests of the public as regards political and economic information and analysis, and meet the organizational needs of the I. P. R. for a channel of contact with the public. Margaret urged me to broach the subject to you. I have not done so because, of course, the idea is not new with me and is already shared in principle, I think, by a number of the American Council staff, including Fred. Nor have I considered the difficult details. Nevertheless, I might offer my conviction, for what it is worth, that the time has come when some such surgical job is imperative. Without a new and lively journal, serving broad, semi-popular interests, I am afraid that the American Council may steadily lose ground, yet it seems impossible to meet the problem by adding another journal to those already existing.

Mr. Edward C. Carter

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July 2, 1940

Naturally the Pacific Council would be reluctant to give up its quarterly, especially as Owen has done so well, but a new joint arrangement with the American Council for an improved monthly publication might do a more effective job for it internationally. In any case, is it not true that the future of the I. P. R. now depends primarily on the future of the American Council and on the latter's being able to carry on with renewed vigor during the difficult period ahead? As for Amerasia it is the opinion of one of the editors and probably of several others that it has written itself out, as now constituted. The Survey, is so good that one hates to touch it; nevertheless it is a luxury today which does not fill the basic need of the American Council and there is no reason why its essential values could not be retained in a new American Council publication of wider appeal, nor does this imply the least criticism of Russell's work which I think is wholly admirable.

It is one thing to toss off a suggestion of this sort and quite another to work out its practical realization. Nevertheless as an American Council member perhaps it is legitimate for me to urge that it ought to be the first order of I. P. R. business today.

Sincerely yours,

Bice

Wm. W. Lockwood,
Secretary

WHL/j

June 10, 1940.

ECC from WJL

My apology for the length of this reply to your letter of May 30 is, first, your request that comments should be as full as possible; and secondly, the fact that your proposal seems to me to raise problems that have not been discussed in the other comments that I have read but are nevertheless fundamental. I am afraid I have wandered considerably from the point in places and let off a certain amount of unasked for steam. Moreover, if I seem to be dogmatic here and there, that is far from my intention. It would be absurd to claim ability to predict the course of events categorically. My object has been merely to indicate the course that I consider most desirable and to suggest that the general line of argument I have very incompletely developed is one that should at least not be entirely ignored. (The entry of Italy into the war after the completion of the rough draft of this note does not affect my argument in any essential.)

The problem appears to be what contribution PACIFIC AFFAIRS can make towards helping its readers in the belligerent countries to secure the justest possible peace on the most permanent possible basis at the earliest possible moment (and incidentally towards helping its readers in the neutral or non-belligerent countries to cooperate in this task).

The difficulty that immediately occurs to me is the fact that freedom of discussion scarcely exists any more in the world today. In the case of most of the belligerent countries it is already impossible for PACIFIC AFFAIRS (or any other journal) to publish a single article that is hostile to the fundamental policies and doctrines of the various Governments. Not only will this soon be the case in all the belligerent countries, but even the few remaining neutral or non-belligerent democracies, including the United States, are unlikely to preserve freedom of discussion much longer.

In view of these facts, the kinds of policy that PACIFIC AFFAIRS can advocate or point towards are strictly limited to those that do not conflict fundamentally with the policies of the Governments of the countries in which PACIFIC AFFAIRS hopes to continue to circulate. But if really effective articles are to be published with regard to the method of ending the war and the nature of the peace settlement, in the case of the belligerents they must inevitably conflict with the policy of the Governments in one or other of the contending alignments, if not with both (unless it is believed that a morally justifiable compromise is possible between rival imperialist powers or between imperialist aggressors and their victims - a view that I, for one, do not hold); and in the case of the non-belligerents (i.e. those countries that are neutral only in so far as they are not actually fighting), if my assumption of the imminent end of freedom of the press is correct, such articles will be to all intents and purposes in the same position as in the case of the belligerents since all opinion hostile to the policy of the favored belligerent side will be suppressed.

But the people you specifically mention as wanting to reach are the PACIFIC AFFAIRS readers in the belligerents Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, China, and Japan. In the case of the first six the difficulties are less obvious, though no less real, than in the case of the last two since these six countries are all fighting on the same side, which is also the side supported by the United States. As far as they are concerned,

therefore, PACIFIC AFFAIRS will have complete freedom of expression so long as it does not oppose the fundamental tenets of the present Governments of the Allies and the United States. But in the case of China and Japan, the only possible types of solution to the war in the Far East (even in its present localized state) that PACIFIC AFFAIRS could conceivably put forward would be such as the present Japanese Government could not possibly allow to be advocated in Japan (even if balanced by presentations of the Japanese solution).

(The fact that PACIFIC AFFAIRS has hitherto continued to be permitted to circulate in Japan can only mean, in my opinion, that it has taken no positive stand on the war issue, either editorially or in individual articles. I am assuming, however, that what you have in mind for PACIFIC AFFAIRS is, in fact, a more positive policy; that is, the advocacy of specific (and presumably alternative) solutions as regards the methods both of ending the war and of laying a permanent foundation for peace in the various conditions under which peace may be at first established. This is the only way, it seems to me, in which PACIFIC AFFAIRS can play a more active and effective part in the present crisis, assuming that such an active part is possible. But if I am wrong in assuming this, then, of course, this whole comment is irrelevant.)

Thus if PACIFIC AFFAIRS adopts a positive attitude (or alternative positive attitudes) towards the Sino-Japanese war, it will cease to circulate in Japan, which may or may not be important. And if it adopts a positive attitude (or alternative positive attitudes) towards the European war and its world-wide implications, and at the same time hopes to continue to circulate legally in the six countries mentioned above and in the United States, it will have to confine its solutions (either now or in the very near future) to such as will not conflict with the fundamental policies of the Governments of these countries.

The importance of this fact depends, of course, on the type of solution that PACIFIC AFFAIRS is likely to put forward. If it confines itself to the discussion of such plans as a Federal Union of capitalist states after the defeat of Hitler, the best means of holding the British Empire together in the event of the defeat of Great Britain, etc., its circulation will be unhampered, but its effectiveness as a guide to the achievement of a just and permanent peace will be slight. If, however, it gets down to fundamentals; admits the very good possibility that this war is not going to end in a German or an Allied victory but in revolution throughout Europe; suggests that this solution is the only one that will ensure permanent peace in Europe and so, eventually, throughout the world; points the way towards this solution; and bases some of its plans for world reorganization on this assumption; if it does all or any of these things, it will be banned immediately abroad and, at least before the year is out, in this country as well.

I am making this point not in order to prove, by an extreme example, that PACIFIC AFFAIRS is going to be denied freedom of expression, but because I think that of all the possible developments on which plans for reorganization may be based, revolution throughout all Europe is the most probable - and incidentally the most desirable. If this is so, PACIFIC AFFAIRS' inability to offer it as at least one of its alternative solutions and to draw up at least some of its plans for world settlement on the basis of such a development would greatly reduce, if not completely destroy, its effectiveness.

Of course, although severe restrictions on the freedom of the press already exist in the belligerent countries, I may be exaggerating the danger of similar

developments in this country. I most sincerely hope I am. But the innumerable Bills of a fascist nature now under discussion, the present temper of Congress and the Administration, and the war and "fifth column" hysteria of the press - all of which are indications of what can be expected as the European crisis grows even more acute - are facts that should at least be seriously considered, quite apart from the basic fact that America is itself rushing headlong towards entry into the war.

(I know that these restrictions are considered necessary by many liberals, who say that dissident minorities have to be suppressed during times of war or other national emergencies, and that only a dictatorship can fight effectively against a dictatorship. This is, to a strictly limited extent, true. But it does not mean that fascism can only be fought by fascism, as has been proved by the internal developments in Spain and China during their wars of national liberation. The acquiescence by a liberal in certain dictatorial measures should surely depend on the nature of the forces behind the dictatorship, of the forces suppressed, and of the ends aimed at by the dictatorship. In this connection, it is important to remember that fascism came to power in Germany on the basis of socialist slogans and to consider the possibility that fascism may come to America by the path of "anti-fascist" agitation and legislation. The very liberals who now welcome the suppression of opinion as applied to the extreme left (called "pro-fascist" or "fifth column") may very soon find their own respectable writings next on the list, unless, of course, they take the not uncommon course of jumping on the bandwaggon.)

All this does not mean that I think it is hopeless for PACIFIC AFFAIRS to attempt to adopt the positive policy you suggest. It merely means that it will have to accept the fact that its effectiveness can only be limited. The problem is to make it as effective as possible within these limitations. More specifically, on the basis of my theory that revolution is the most likely and desirable development in Europe, its policy should be to do everything possible within the limitations imposed or about to be imposed upon it to assist such a development and draw up blue-prints for a new world organization on the basis of such a development.

Since the Soviet Union is going to be the most important single force in the European revolution, PACIFIC AFFAIRS' first task should be to do all it can to increase its readers' understanding of the Soviet Union, its internal structure, and particularly its foreign policy.

Secondly, it should make a very special point of clarifying the issues involved in the question of America's participation in the war. The present position, as I see it, is that, until there is a radical change in the outlook of the Administration, American participation will inevitably mean a strengthening of the forces of reaction and counter-revolution. The solution of Europe's problem lies with the people of Europe in cooperation with the Soviet Union. Unless we have absolutely convincing guarantees that the power of America would be thrown behind, and not against, these forces, American participation would be disastrous. It is difficult to be more precise than this since it is impossible to foresee exactly how things are going to develop. But in general, it seems to me that, however it may come about, the character of the present war is likely to change into a straight revolutionary struggle on a European scale, and that if America, the last stronghold of capitalism, is involved in that struggle, there can be little doubt as to which side it is going to support.

I know that many members of the IPR are of the opinion that at least three other alternative developments are just as likely, and two of them far more desirable, than the one I claim to be the most likely and desirable. The

first is a Hitler victory and Nazi domination of most of Europe, followed by a continuation of the war for democracy and against Hitler by America and the remnants of the British Empire (or, as I should put it, a new and even greater struggle for a redivision of the world); the second is an Allied victory, with or without American participation, followed by a United States of Europe or World Federal Union (or, more probably, a fascist European bloc under Anglo-French domination); and the third is a stalemate, resulting from the complete exhaustion of both sides and followed by a negotiated peace (that is, an attempt to establish a partnership of British, French, German, and Italian capitalists in a European fascist bloc directed against the Soviet Union and, ultimately, the United States.)

I agree that all these developments are possible, but I think that all of them, in the forms that they would inevitably take barring revolutionary developments, are extremely undesirable. Moreover, I think that before any one of them is completed, it will be superseded by the revolutionary development, or at least that it will be very closely followed by such a development.

But not only will the war probably end in revolution anyway; it can certainly be ended far more rapidly and permanently by revolution than by any of the other three alternative developments. The average man in England, France, and Germany, still probably believes that he is fighting for the independent existence of his country against foreign domination, as indeed he is as long as the present Governments remain in power. But by the same token, he is also fighting, whether he realizes it or not, for the domination of the enemy country by his own rulers (and incidentally for the preservation of his own country's slave empires and dependencies). But what will happen if the workers in one of the belligerent countries overthrow their ruling class, set up a workers' government, free their colonies and dependencies, and appeal to the workers of the enemy country not to kill their fellow workers? The result will be a complete change in the attitude of the workers in the enemy country toward the war. Even if this change is not given effective expression immediately; if, for example, German armies overrun and dominate a revolutionary France and possibly a revolutionary England and a handful of revolutionary Balkan states as well - what then? First of all, it is, I think, unlikely that the German workers, and still more improbable that the Soviet Union, would allow such a thing to happen; but even if the reaction of the German workers and the Soviet Union were not immediate (for reasons of revolutionary strategy, for example, in the latter case), Hitler would be faced with the task of holding down the entire working class of most of Europe, that is, the most politically conscious working class (outside the Soviet Union) in the world. Fascism on such a scale would be impossible. It has only been possible in the past because each fascist State has only had to suppress its own working class - and has received invaluable assistance in this task from the capitalist democracies. Formerly, while the ruling classes of all the nations of Europe were solidly united against the working class of Europe, the workers of Europe were skillfully kept disunited. But if in the course of inflicting total defeat on the bourgeois democracies Hitler thus eliminates his former powerful class allies on whose support his very existence has in the past depended, his regime will be faced by a real united front of the workers of Europe - and the Soviet Union. And it would not last long under these conditions.

Of course, the rulers of Britain and France and many of the capitalists of Germany (e.g. Thyssen) have realized all along that war between the great capitalist States of Europe can only result in the end of capitalism. Hence

the frantic appeals of the Allies to German capitalism to "come home" (to use Dorothy Thompson's phrase) into the class front of capitalism to save "civilization as we know it" (decadent capitalism) from the threat of "Asiatic barbarism" (socialism). The necessary expansion of German capitalism was, of course, to take place at the expense of the Soviet Union. But the most powerful elements of the German ruling class decided otherwise, perhaps because they feared the Red Army more than the Allied military machine; perhaps because they feared the effect on the German workers of a war against the Soviet Union; or perhaps because they thought it better to defeat the Allies first and then turn on the Soviet Union. But whether or not the choice that they have made is fraught with less danger to European capitalism than the alternative choice, the fact remains that the choice has been made and that presumably the Nazi leaders have not forgotten to devise means by which they hope to suppress the European revolution that will certainly result from their decision.

There seem to be only two alternatives. One is to attempt to apply to all Europe the terroristic methods applied to Czechoslovakia and Poland, that is the method of Gestapo control directed from Berlin; the other, to set up puppet Governments in Britain and France composed of British and French fascists, that is, all those who would rather be capitalists in a satellite state of the Greater German Empire than citizens of a socialist Europe. That many members of the British and French ruling class would welcome such a solution and are already thinking along these lines is certain. However, I don't think that either of these attempts to dam up the revolution is likely to succeed since the strength of the united workers of Europe will be overpowering.

But to get back to the program proposed for PACIFIC AFFAIRS. In addition to developing in its readers a thorough understanding of the Soviet Union and of the implications of America's entry into the war, which would involve thrashing out the whole question of the nature of the war, it should consider the line of action to be pursued if and when the stage is reached of a revolutionary Europe and the last stand of capitalism, and possibly of the remnants of the British Empire, on the American continent. The hysteria of the American capitalist class and the full-blooded fascism that will accompany it under these conditions will make impossible the continued publication of PACIFIC AFFAIRS, even as a mildly liberal journal. In fact, if it is to make any significant contribution towards the solution of the rapidly developing crisis, it will have to pack all it can into its next few issues, and even then its circulation will be confined to the U.S.A., China, and the Soviet Union. But it would be better to awaken a few of its readers to reality than to continue to foster the illusions of a wider public.

The ideal line of action to be advocated in the situation envisaged above should be cooperation with the European revolutionaries and the Soviet Union in their attempt to build a socialist Europe as a nucleus for a world socialist order, with the obvious corollary of the establishment of socialism in this country. A second-best policy would be refusal to intervene in any way in Europe or to play any part in the maintenance of the British Empire as such, coupled with the rendering of all possible aid to China, an embargo on Japan, and an alliance with the Soviet Union for the prevention of further Japanese aggression. (Any action with regard to the Far East (or in Europe, for that matter) that is not taken in collaboration with the Soviet Union must be considered imperialistic since there can be no other reasonable explanation of the failure to enlist Soviet cooperation.) But in the case of both these policies, the

first step would have to be the establishment of a more or less progressive Government, or at least the compulsion of a radical change in the outlook of the present Government, in the United States.

As regards the policy to be advocated on the assumption of a German victory, an Allied victory, or a stalemate and negotiated peace, and of the failure in each case of the revolution to materialize, all of which eventualities I think are unlikely, I consider valueless all proposals that envisage solutions that do not lead towards the basic solution of revolution. Thus the proposal to saddle America and the remains of the British Empire with the task of carrying on the fight against the Greater German Empire would mean a third world imperialist war on a grander scale than that of the two previous ones. Again, all proposals based on the assumption that the present Governments of Britain and France will be interested in some form of Federal Union ignore not only the avowed war aims of these Governments but also the fact that, (notwithstanding the show of "Labor" representation in Britain,) they represent imperialist powers, which are by their very nature precluded from making anything but an imperialist peace. Finally, all proposals based on the premise that a just compromise is possible between two imperialist powers as such ignore the fact that such a compromise can only be based on the continued exploitation of the peoples of those powers and on further imperialistic aggressions on an even greater scale. To quote Lenin on the two latter points: ". . . the United States of Europe as the result of an agreement between the European capitalists is possible, but what kind of agreement would that be? An agreement to suppress socialism in Europe . . ." Yet a permanent peace settlement on any other basis except socialism is impossible.

I have dealt primarily with the problem of Europe and American relations with Europe because its solution is fundamental to the solution of the world problem as a whole. Moreover, I consider that the issues¹ have raised apply equally, mutatis mutandis, to the Pacific Area and to South America (and particularly to Mexico in the immediate future). However, I fully realize that it is useless to advocate any progressive policy as far as this country is concerned without also agitating for a drastic change in the attitude, which must now mean a change in the composition, of the American Government. It is not only useless; it will very soon be impossible - legally.

In brief, then, I whole-heartedly agree with your suggestion that PACIFIC AFFAIRS should adopt a more positive policy with regard to the solution of the world crisis. But I feel very strongly that unless it accepts the possibility of the general line of development here outlined, encourages full discussion of the point of view here put forward, and bases at least some of its proposed solutions on ~~this~~ such a development and viewpoint, it will not be fulfilling the function that it should at least try to fulfill. Moreover, I repeat, if it is to adopt this line of approach to the problem, it must start doing so without a moment's delay.

SOVIET

ASIAN FRONTIER

TECHNIQUE: TARA TUVU

William H. Miller

... an international factor in the course of the war in both Europe and the
... the foreign policy of Soviet Russia. Subject to rumors and counter
... to what is now going to be said via A via Germany or England, Japan or China,
... however, been carried on an interesting policy with respect to the
... along the Asiatic frontier. This policy within the recent warring of
... the fact that the land has been fixed for some time and affords an in-
... of Soviet frontier technique in Asia. Stretching from the Caspian Sea
... these frontier states which have been brought within the Soviet orbit be-
... until recently, relatively unknown to the rest of the world.

... is one of these states. Situated between the Sayan range which separates
... and the Taim (Tungus) range which divides it from northwestern
... it was one of the last strongholds of primitive nomadic cul-
... the original inhabitants of the forested part of this land, who were Turkic trib-
... the forest-land, the lived by constructing reindeer and by hunting wild game. T
... of the forest part of the country, who were Mongol tribes, were the cattle-
... the nomadic Turkic tribesmen of the no-
... was changed from a nomadic land ruled by feudal princes and later
... agricultural country governed by progressive natives etc.
... According to the Soviet Russians, it is a
... primitive land.

... is a small country, no larger in area and in population than the
... more important economically to the Soviet Union than Nevada

... of this point, cf. Oren Lettman's review of R. Kabe,
... Part II Pre-revolutionary Tuvu] in PACIFIC
... all information about contemporary Tuvu has come either directly from the Soviet
... in this perspective.

is at present to the United States. In politics and economics, however, it is as closely bound to the U.S.S.R. as Nevada is to the United States. Before it became Sovietized, it was called Urianghai. Until 1911 it was treated as a subordinate extension of Outer Mongolia, which in turn was a part of the Manchu Empire. In the year of the Chinese Revolution Chinese Hegemony over Urianghai was replaced by Tsarist Russian control. The Tsarist Russians considered it an entity quite separate from Outer Mongolia. The Chinese Government did not in spite of this relinquish its claim to either Urianghai or Outer Mongolia. When Outer Mongolia was transformed into the Mongolian People's Republic in 1921 and declared itself an independent state, Tana Tuva did likewise. In fact the declaration of independence of Tana Tuva came slightly earlier than that of Outer Mongolia. The Chinese Government did not, however, recognize the independence of either Outer Mongolia or Tana Tuva. Only the Soviet Government has recognized the independence of these states.

The "original" inhabitants of Tana Tuva are Turkic rather than Mongol, with a Mongol "overflow" into parts of the country. According to the Soviet Russians, these people were so primitive that they had no written language until 1930. The technique of bestowing a written language upon a pre-literate people is an old one with the Soviet Russians in their relations with Asiatic peoples within the U.S.S.R. On the basis of the new Turkic alphabetized language the inhabitants of Tana Tuva became exposed to the written forms of Soviet propaganda. Presumably up to 1930 the only people who could read were some feudal lords and lamas who knew Mongol and were acquainted with Buddhist works (printed in Tibetan rather than Mongol), leaving about 99 per cent of the population illiterate. Since the adoption of the Turkic alphabetized language, illiteracy has been greatly reduced. About 100 works have been published in the Tuvan languages, and in addition there are three newspapers and two magazines. According to the central committee chairman of the Tuvan People's Revolutionary Party, "45 per cent of all the books

3 Cf. Owen Lattimore, "Outer Mongolia and Urianghai," *The China Year Book*, Shanghai, 1939, p. 457.

4 Toka, "Tuvinskaya Narodnaya Respublika," *International Herald Tribune*, number 7/8, 1940, pp. 91-93. Also cf. E. Vilensky, "Through the Tuvan People's Republic," *Foreign News*, September 12, 1940, pp. 2, 23. The recent data here given on Tana Tuva are taken from these articles.

budget goes for cultural ~~works~~ and for the protection of ~~the~~ health of the toilers." ⁵

In spite of the fact that there were on the eve of World War about 12,000 Russians in Uvingshai, the Soviet Russians say that before the Revolution there was neither a school, nor hospital, nor doctor, nor teacher in this area. All the native population moreover was nomadic before the Revolution. The Revolution filtered into Tannu Tuva by 1921. It was not, however, until ten years later that the Government began its program of confiscating the property of feudal lords and lamas. Being a primitive pastoral country, the wealth of Tannu Tuva consists mainly in the herds of cattle. In 1933, there were 932,000 head of cattle while in 1938 there were 1,359,323 head, according to the Soviet Russians, making in the five year period a 49 per cent increase in the size of the herds. This phenomenon is attributed by the Soviet Russians to the action of the Tuvan Revolution in confiscating the property of lords and lamas. More significant figures are given for the increase in fodder, which leaped from 5,300 tons in 1930 to 130,000 tons in 1938. This increase in the production of fodder naturally would lessen the nomadic character of Tuvan life which would become, therefore, more stationary. The whole nomadic form of existence would undergo a remarkable change as the nomads would not have to wander from pasture to pasture, but would be able to raise livestock by keeping them penned up and fed with fodder raised by agricultural cultivation. The amount of fodder available in 1938 for about 1,000,000 head of cattle which had to be fed is not very great in terms of Western standards of livestock feeding, but the increase is important as showing a trend in the direction of a less nomadic form of life. In the period from 1930 to 1938, the amount of land under cultivation has doubled. As a result Tannu Tuva in 1938 for the first time completely furnished its own bread supply without importation.

The volume of trade since the Revolution has increased more than 350 per cent, while the price of commodities has decreased, according to the Soviet Russians, 300 per cent to 450 per cent. This is probably due to the nationalization of industry which has been taking place in the Soviet Union, the sole country which carries on trade with Tannu Tuva. (Trade with Outer Mongolia is presumably insignificant because the products

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of the two countries are similar. The industrialization of the Soviet Union has influenced that of Tana Tuva. Agriculture has in part become mechanized. Tractors, reapers, mowing machines, threshing machines, and combines are now found. So are built by the Soviet Russians, in different parts of Tana Tuva. Even in the zones of these extremely primitive nomads of this frontier region, one can find sewing machines and phonographs. The nomadic people are, if we believe the Soviet accounts, beginning to settle down in small communities where for the first time they are housed in permanent buildings.

The main city of Tana Tuva is the capital, Kyzyl, which means "red". Other principal settlements are Khamsyra, Samagaltai, and Kyzyl-Kumuk. Post offices, garages, drug stores, restaurants, movies, schools and hospitals are making their first appearance before the horizon of this frontier country. This is a great contrast to the old mode of life of the former nomads who continually were migrating with their herds, setting up their yurts (wooden frameworks covered with felts made of wool) for only a few days and then moving on to the next good pasture.

Tana Tuva is relatively rich in natural resources, which are being utilized more than before the Revolution. Gold and coal mining is carried on, forests are cut down, lumber is processed in saw mills, and water power is harnessed to electric stations. This is all done under the direction and assistance of the Soviet technicians. The Soviet Russians are not really doing anything different in Tana Tuva; they are continuing their policy of modernization of the economic, political and social life of the border states of which Tuva is a good example. This country is especially undeveloped and the Soviet Russians are particularly interested in utilizing its national resources. The potential wealth of the country is often mentioned by Soviet writers.

The Soviet Russians have introduced into Tana Tuva a type of government very similar to that which they have given to Outer Mongolia, now called the Mongolian People's Republic. As the chairman of the central committee of the Tana Tuvan People's Revolutionary Party has characterized Tana Tuva, it is "a country of the people's revolutionary, anti-

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Specialist, anti-fascist, bourgeois democratic republic, a new type, gradually progressing along the path of non-capitalistic development." There is a Great Rural like the one for Mongolia. The word "rural" means assembly or council. This body has a counterpart in the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union itself. The Great Rural is elected for a three-year term. It in turn elects the Little Rural which acts as the supreme authority when the Great Rural is not in session, as a Central Executive Committee which carries on between sessions of the Great Rural. When the Little Rural is not in session, the all-powerful agency of government is the Presidium. It is self-evident that this pyramiding has been taken over from the Soviet form of government. There has been an increasing interest in politics among the inhabitants of Tsam Tsan. According to Soviet writers, in the election for the Great Rural in 1935 only 60 per cent of the potential electorate participated, while in the campaign of 1938 85 per cent participated.

Working side by side with the Government is the Tsam Tsan People's Revolutionary Party. The quality of government and party is of course based upon the model of the Soviet Union. In 1935, the Tsam Tsan People's Revolutionary Party had 1,500 members, but by 1938 the number of party members was about 5,000. Great as this increase may be in terms of percentages, the party is a select group like the Russian Communist Party. Associated with the party are such organizations as the Revolutionary Union of Youth, the Pioneers, and the Trade Unions. The Tsam Tsan Revsomal (Revolutionary Union of Youth), which corresponds to the Komsomol of the Soviet Union, has 5,669 members, distributed into 100 cells. The Revsomal has charge of the Pioneers which include 2,700 children divided into 1,700 brigades. The Revsomal has its own newspaper, the BYANS (Mongolian: Byans) which has a circulation of 7,000. Besides this regular publication, there are also issued by the Revsomal scores of wall newspapers, a form of publication well known throughout the Orient. The Revsomal plays an active part in the Tsam Tsan. This formula is the same as that for the Mongolian People's Republic. Cf. William H. Hall, "Outer Mongolian After State of the Orient," International Encyclopedia, New York, Vol. 1, No. 5, 1937, p. 28.

political life of the country, filling for instance through its members 22 per cent of the seats in the Little Khural. It is also very active in educational work, having organized circles and schools for the teaching of propaganda to the young men and women and to their children.

A significant deduction may be made from these facts drawn from Soviet sources. The success which the contemporary Russians have had in transforming both Mongolia and Tannu Tuva into Soviet satellites is due to the very practical policy of winning the support of the young men and women to the new regime and of giving them more and more responsibility in the administration of their countries. This policy contrasts strikingly to that of the Japanese in Manchuria, where old men have been set up as stooges to assure Japanese control. Although the young Mongols and Turkic tribesmen are to some extent puppets manipulated by the Soviet Russians, nevertheless they are being trained in the process of government. The main significance of Tannu Tuva lies in the unique methods employed by the Soviet Russians not only to change a backward primitive country to a socialist economy with political and party organs modeled after those of the Soviet Union, but to provide the capacity for self-government.

Columbus, December 1948

ИЗДАНИЕ I КВАРТАЛА 1957 ГОДА. ВЪВЕДЕНИЕ: СТАТИСТИЧЕСКИЕ ПОКАЗАТЕЛИ НАРОДНОГО ХОЗЯЙСТВА СССР И КАПИТАЛИЗМА (USSR and the Capitalist Countries). Compiled by I. K. Kuznetsov, edited by L. I. Kuznetsov. Moscow and Leningrad: Gosplanizdat, 1957. 304 pp. 160.

THIS is a very useful statistical handbook needed to compare relative rates of economic development of the U.S.S.R. and the "capitalist countries." The material is well arranged, the tables clear and legible. The collection is almost complete, including even such items as "air transport," "numbers of telephone apparatus," and "numbers of radio subscribers." The comparative data on foreign countries come from government publications and trustworthy national or international sources, such as the publications of the International Institute of Agriculture (Rome), U.S. Census publications, Statistical Abstracts (New York), British and Statistical (U.S. Department of Agriculture), International Labor Office (Geneva) and others.

The introductory part of the handbook is concerned with general features of economic growth under Soviet rule as compared with such principal foreign countries as the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany. Items represented are general development, economic independence (self-sufficiency), process of industrialization, mechanization, process of concentration, productivity of labor, economic and social standards of the working class, internal trade, medical service, educational institutions, publications, trade unions, natural resources. The main part of the volume is divided into three sections: (a) industrial production, (b) agricultural economy, and (c) communications. The statistical material in the introductory part is accompanied by short comments.

NICHOLAS K. KUZNETSOV

University of California, November 1959

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EOC

WIR

800 Gilman Hall
Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore, Maryland

June 2, 1948

Mr. W. M. Ladafinsky
Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations
U. S. Department of Agriculture
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Ladafinsky:

Some time ago I wrote you about your interest in agricultural questions in Korea, and now I am reminded by "The Pacific Area in American Research," a list of current research projects put out by the Executive Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, that your interest also extends to an agricultural survey of the Netherlands Indies.

If, in the course of working up your material on either of these subjects, you should see your way to writing an article for PACIFIC AFFAIRS, I should be very much interested to hear from you.

Yours very sincerely,

Dean Lattimore

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ECC ✓

WLH

800 Gilman Hall
Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore, Maryland

June 8, 1960

Mr. Owen L. Dawson
Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations
U. S. Department of Agriculture
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dawson:

From "The Pacific Area in American Research," a list of current research projects put out by the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, I note with great interest that you are working on "Philippine Agriculture and Some of the Adjustment Necessary in Connection with the Independence of that Country." If it should seem to you that any of your material, or any aspect of the subject, would make an article suitable for PACIFIC AFFAIRS, I should be most interested to hear from you.

Yours very sincerely,

Samuel Hays

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200

100 Glass Hill
Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore, Maryland

September 22, 1940

Mr. Frederick V. Field
Institute of Pacific Relations
125 East 58th Street
New York City

Dear Fred:

This morning I Mr. J. Taylor, at Room 500, 1414 E Street, Washington, D. C., was up to get things to get hold of an economist competent to deal with Japanese economic financial policies. I at once gave him your name, and told him that in account of getting the new edition of the economic book back ready for publication, you would be in touch with the right people.

He said that he already had you in his list to ring up, and went on to ask about other people. I think I forgot to say at the beginning of this letter, that he is connected with one or another branch or subdivision of the Defense Advisory Commission. I then gave him Gajdarmov's name, as being both a trained economist and currently working in original Japanese material. I pointed out that for his purposes the fact that Gajdarmov does not yet have his citizenship might be a barrier, but he held so that in some cases they proceed by appointing someone to a general job, with military allowances for taking on assignments for such purposes as this.

Yours very sincerely,

Johns Hopkins

200 Glenn Hall
Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore, Maryland

September 18, 1960

Miss Helen Graham
Institute of Pacific Relations
125 East 66th Street
New York City

Dear Miss:

Up in Maine I ran into an old Marine Corps acquaintance from China. He subscribed to PACIFIC AFFAIRS himself, and suggested to me that we might circularize a number of schools maintained by the armed services. Among these are the Infantry School at Fort Benning, the Marine Corps School at Quantico, the Naval Academy Post Graduate School at Annapolis, and so on. Most of these schools, he said, have their own libraries.

He did not seem to know, offhand, where one could get a complete list of such schools.

Another individual name worth circularizing is Dr. Peter Kroufaldt, University of Chicago Medical School.

Yours very sincerely,

Owen Lattimore

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2/2
15/4
W. H. H. H. H.
W. H. H. H. H.
W. H. H. H. H.
Plymouth Union
Vermont
15 July '40

Dr Frank Lorimer
The American University
1901 F Street Northwest
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr Lorimer:

Many thanks for sending me a copy of your Williamson paper. I am extremely glad to have this on file.

As you more than once mention the importance of capital for the potential development of new backward areas, I think you will be interested in a long article on this problem and its related problems by William Brandt, which I shall publish in the forthcoming (September) issue of PACIFIC AFFAIRS.

Your effort to arrive at a detached and critically focused view of Soviet problems and policies is, I think, one of the most interesting aspects of your paper. As far as the dynamics of population increase are concerned, I should think Russia must be interesting but baffling. Take abortion: it appears to have (or to have had) something as importance greater in scale than in any other country. Perhaps different in quality, too. But you have first officially sanctioned abortion; then a Government effort to stop it, met apparently by wide resistance. What did this mean? That the State saw the need for more citizens, but the people were already demanding a higher standard of living, and as they could improve their standards in any other way, owing to the drive for industrialization, for collectivization, etc. etc., they did what they could to keep up their personal standards by trying not to have children. There must, I think, be something special and very interesting in this kind of problem; perhaps it is a real index to some of the processes that go on in an exploitation-less society, because in profit-societies the greater the poverty, the lower the standard of living, the higher the birthrate.

These are all questions in which I am interested, but in which I am no expert.

Yours very sincerely,

W. H. H. H. H.
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FVF

FROM EOC

APRIL 15, 1940

You, Mrs. Barnes and Miss Taylor will want to note these copies of Hornbeck's letters to me of February 19 and 20.

On the occasion of my last visit to Washington, I saw Hornbeck and asked him what his point was with reference to the agenda. He said that he likes very much to attend our conferences, but that he is under tremendous pressure and if the agenda and time-table had reached him before he left Washington he would have come for all day Sunday instead of coming as he did for all of Saturday and two-thirds of Sunday.

He made three points:

- (1) The agenda for Saturday was purely factual. Though important to most of the members of the conference, it was not new to him.
- (2) The discussion on policy and American public opinion which did interest him enormously was not set until Sunday afternoon.
- (3) He did not know until he reached Princeton that there was going to be no session Saturday night, so Saturday evening was in a sense for him, though pleasant, wasted.

I told Hornbeck that I had been dilatory in sending him the agenda, but that hereafter I was sure that it would be possible to send him the agenda and time-table of such conferences as the American Council desired to have him attend several days in advance so that he could plan accordingly.

I made it quite clear to him that I was the only one to blame in this matter.

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May 2, 1940

MEMORANDUM TO: EOC
FROM: FVF

You will be glad to know that two more Wall Street magazines, THE NEW MASSES and SOVIET RUSSIA TODAY, have commended us for our denunciation of the Abend map.

June 6, 1940

MEMORANDUM TO: ECC
FROM: FVF

Your memorandum attached to Lippmann's article appearing in today's NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE raises questions of policy which I should like very much to have clarified. Your suggestion that I or one of my colleagues reply to Lippmann's article follows on a number of similar suggestions which you have made from time to time.

Before expressing my views on this question as it seems to me to affect the policies of the organization, let me hasten to say that Lippmann's article spoiled my scrambled eggs at breakfast, in other words I am not only in complete disagreement with his point of view but I feel disgusted that it should still be advanced. I am particularly disturbed because it comes forward almost simultaneously with the extraordinary about-face taken by the DAILY NEWS, the report from Washington that a substantial part of the Navy may be withdrawn from Pacific waters and the apparently widespread feeling in the Administration and among newspaper circles that in order to fight the European war we have to sell out the Far Eastern situation.

In spite of these strongly held views, I feel emphatically that it would be a serious mistake for any staff member of the American Council to make any public refutation of Lippmann's articles, of the DAILY NEWS editorials or of anything similar. I make a sharp distinction between the kind of job which we were able to do on the Hallett Abend poster-map and what is implied in refuting a political argument. In the former case it was a straight matter of facts and represented, in my view, the first time that we were able to attack a rotten correspondent on those grounds. We would not, however, in my opinion have been justified from the organization's point of view in attacking Abend's earlier dispatch reporting extensive Soviet naval bases in the North Pacific because to have done so would have involved us in political interpretation rather than facts.

Had Lippmann in this article made some errors in fact — had he, for instance, reported that ~~Mao Tse-tung~~ just attempted to assassinate Chiang Kai-shek, or that Chinese farmers in North China were heartily cooperating with the Japanese in promoting the production of cotton — we might perfectly appropriately have called him on those points. He does not do anything of the sort, however, he simply argues for an American political policy with which you and I happen to disagree violently. In my view we could not reply in writing without committing the organization.

I will grant that in the last analysis the borderlines of this policy are very difficult to define. I intend, for instance, in a speech I am going to make at Charlottesville next week, to give more weight to the kind of American Far Eastern policy in which I believe than the one which Lippmann advocates. This is simply a matter of judgment because I am quite confident that what I say at Charlottesville will not receive any conspicuous attention and that I can undertake that speech in my personal capacity to a far greater extent than if I wrote a letter to the HERALD TRIBUNE refuting Lippmann.

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I would appreciate having your views on this question because I assume from your present suggestion regarding the Lippmann article and from previous ones which you have made that you disagree.

July 2, 1940.

PVF from ECC

Recently I wrote to a Chinese friend in Hongkong asking about Kuomintang-Communist relations. He is not a member of the Secretariat of either the China I.P.R. or the Pacific Council. Under date of May 31st he wrote me as follows:

"Since last March I have been worried about the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communists. You may be aware that the Communists have been conducting publicity against the Central Government for the last 12 months. They have printed lots of pamphlets under the name of a certain Mr. Robert, at first at Hongkong and then at Manila. Their criticisms seem reasonable enough, but it is strange that they should print them in English instead of Chinese. Moreover, quite a number of Kuomintang magistrates and officials have been done to death by the Communists in certain areas. All this has been going on for the last ten months or so. The Central Government has done nothing to retaliate. But since last January, certain Party members apparently couldn't stand any more Communist propaganda and anti-Government actions. It was then decided that some measures should be taken to counteract Communist propaganda. So a good many pamphlets in Chinese have been circulated abroad detailing the anti-Government activities of the Communists. The whole affair was deplorable. I did what I could to impress upon our authorities the unfortunate effect which any semi-official propaganda against the Chinese Communists would have on foreign friends of China, and how welcome it would be to China's enemies. I suggested that no more pamphlets should be circulated against the communists, and that the Central authorities should tell the Communists that they must stop all anti-Government propaganda and subversive activities in future. I am glad to tell you that this has been done. So, for the present at any rate, there is peace between the Central Government and the Communists. But I would deceive you if I do not tell you that there has been no final settlement of the Kuomintang-Communist misunderstanding. However, there is no reason for undue pessimism. I still think that a satisfactory and lasting solution is not impossible, if there is good faith on both sides.

"I have written rather frankly to you, because I owe it to you as a real friend of China. The truth is oftentimes most unpleasant, but I know you like to hear it. Please keep what I have here written confidential."

129 East 52nd Street
New York City

January 8, 1940

ENCLOSURE

Dear Mr. White:

It has occurred to me that you may wish to have a copy of Dr. Jessup's closing summary of the I.P.E. Study Meeting at Virginia Beach. As you know, a very distinguished group of Chinese attended. Those who were there are the following:

Dr. F. W. Yen, Chairman
P. C. Chang
E. P. Chen
P. T. Chen
Chiao-ling Chi
Tsai Sheng Chien
S. P. Chow

Peelin Dai
E. C. Li
Kuan Lin Wen
Liu Lu Yen
Parker Lewis
Kiao Shih Lung Wang

The Chinese approach was unusually good, for it represented the different schools of thought in China. Every school was fully represented.

I often think of the very great kindness that Dr. Hollington Hong, the Generalissimo, Dr. Kung and you showed me when I was in Chungking last year. I wish you would write me about your plans and tell me how long you plan to remain in your present job.

Sincerely yours,

Edward C. Carter

Mr. Theodore E. White
P.O. Box 107
Chungking, China

P.S. The foregoing is rather formal and should have been begun "Dear Teddy". At least, I hope you will not object to this salutation hereafter.

A trusted member of the I.P.E. staff is about to take a journey on my behalf to certain countries that are not too popular at the moment in Wall Street or in Jewish circles. Mails across the Atlantic are interrupted and it may be easier for him to communicate with me through you than in any other way.

I am wondering, therefore, whether you would be willing to forward to me by clipper any letters that come to you for me. To simplify things, the letters will be addressed to you "Dear Ned" and will be signed "Adam". You may think that with this salutation they are addressed to you, but you will soon discover that they should be sent on to me by the quickest route. If you discover that there is any serious interruption in the mails, I would greatly appreciate it if you could send me a duplicate by an alternate quick route.

Mr. Theodore E. White

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January 8, 1940

If you communicate with me about the letters, please refer to them as, for example, "a letter from A has just been received."

Also, please let me know if you are under any expense for postage or cables, on behalf of the I.P.R., so that I can reimburse you from time to time.

E.C.C.

CC-File

The first of these is the fact that the
 government has been unable to raise
 the necessary funds to carry out
 its policy. This is due to the
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 funds to carry out its policy.

[illegible]

After a short stay at the waiting for the steamer with the proposed
other short stay at the Virginia Beach. Ultimately I went to Bermuda
and being in Bermuda I found out that something, but as this is
mostly taken care of, I went out at the moment I would first like to
arrange to be a little more active for me a critic of the
first draft. So that I can see it in perspective but to go ahead with
the work.

1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem. This involves gathering information about the situation and understanding the needs of the stakeholders involved.

2. Once the problem is identified, the next step is to develop a plan. This involves setting goals, identifying resources, and determining the steps that need to be taken to address the problem.

3. The third step is to implement the plan. This involves putting the plan into action and monitoring progress to ensure that the goals are being met.

4. Finally, the fourth step is to evaluate the results. This involves assessing the effectiveness of the plan and making adjustments as needed to improve the outcome.

THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION
AND
RECORDS
MANAGEMENT
NEW YORK, N.Y.

Charles E. Smith, Jr.
Division of Control
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

I hereby refer to
of registration -
Institute of Pacific Relations

My dear Mr. Carter:

I refer to my letter of May 22, 1940 and to previous correspondence in regard to the question of the possible obligations of the Institute of Pacific Relations and of the Pacific Council under the Act of June 9, 1938, as amended, requiring the registration of agents of foreign principals.

This question has now been considered by the appropriate officers of the Department, and these officers are of the opinion that, basing their judgment on the material which you very kindly left on the occasion of your visit to the Department on May 14, neither the Institute of Pacific Relations nor the Pacific Council is subject to the requirement of registration under the above-mentioned legislation. This opinion is, of course, entirely informal and

is

Mr. Edward G. Carter,
Secretary-General,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York, New York.

10-10-38
The Department
has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th inst.

I am sorry that the Department cannot accept the collection
which is left with the Department at the time of your
visit.

Sincerely yours

Charles W. Post
Acting Chief, Division of Controls

Accompaniments:

1. The American Council
Institute of Pacific
Relations, Incorporated."
2. "Institute of Pacific
Relations - Report of the
International Secretariat
1937-1938."
3. "Pacific Affairs" vol. XIII,
no. 1.
4. "International Studies of
Far Eastern and Pacific
Problems".
5. Inner Asian Frontiers of
China.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

May 20, 1940.

I have been your letter of May 17 until we had been able to ascertain the reaction of the interested officials of the Department to the question of whether or not the Institute should register under the Act of June 1, 1938. We now find a unanimous opinion in agreement with us that the activities of the Institute, as described to us, are principally in furtherance of bona fide scientific or academic purposes. We will receive an official letter to this effect in a few days. In view of this favorable decision, I am returning to you Mr. Jessup's letter of May 20 which we shall not have to use.

Very sincerely yours,


Charles E. Keen

Charles E. Keen,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
120 East Fifty-second Street,
New York, New York.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply, refer to
Co 610 (1940) Registration -
Institute of Pacific Relations

My dear Mr. Carter:

With reference to your letter of May 14, 1940, I am sure that the material which you left at my office at the time of your visit to the Department on May 14 will be sufficient to enable the Department to formulate an opinion in respect to the question of the possible obligations of the Institute of Pacific Relations and of the Pacific Council under the Act of June 9, 1938, as amended. This question is now being considered by the appropriate officers of the Department, and I hope to be able to inform you of their decision within a few days.

Sincerely yours,


Charles W. Young
Acting Chief, Division of Controls

Mr. Edward G. Carter,
Secretary-General,
Institute of Pacific Relations,
129 East Fifty-second Street,
New York, New York.